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The Corporate Governance Industry
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This Article considers the role of the corporate governance industry as a voluntary
regulator. The corporate governance industry influences (and in some cases effectively
controls) the votes of trillions of dollars of equity, and affects the governance policies
and fortunes of thousands of companies through proxy voting recommendations and
governance ratings. This Article considers the increasing influence of the corporate
governance industry, and argues that potential conflicts of interest within some
governance firms cast doubt on the reliability of their proxy advice and governance
ratings. Additionally, governance firms may be overstepping their expertise in proxy
voting decisions and in governance rating, in part because of their reliance on “good
governance metrics” for which there is little evidentiary support. Finally, erroneous
governance metrics (and indeed, a reliance on one-size-fits-all governance checklists)
promoted by influential governance advisers not only affect important shareholder voting
decisions and decisions on whether to invest in or divest from a particular company, but
may also have a more general, harmful effect on corporate governance regulation. A
number of academics have argued that federal expansion into corporate governance
issues has significant negative consequences. Perhaps most importantly, Sarbanes-Oxley
mandates specific governance policies rather than setting broad standards, thereby
eliminating some vital flexibility in corporate governance. This Article argues that the
corporate governance industry may have similarly harmful effects by pressuring
companies to adopt a homogenized set of governance rules which may not be suited to
the companies’ respective requirements.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There is no specific set of corporate governance rules, standards, and principles to
which every U.S. corporation must adhere. Rather, corporations are directed by a variety
of sources, some public, some private, which develop and enforce governance rules.
Several intertwined factors explain why we do not have a single rule set, source, and
regulator of corporate governance. The first is our federalist system of government,
which reserves to the states the powers not delegated to the federal government by the
Constitution,1 and among the powers traditionally reserved to the states is the ability to
charter and regulate corporations and other business forms.2 But while the states are the
primary corporate regulators, state legislatures have left much of the substantive
regulation of corporations to companies themselves by creating enabling rules that allow
companies to fashion their own governance structures within a broad statutory
framework.3 Roberta Romano has argued that the regulation of corporations primarily by
states rather than federal regulators is the “genius” of American corporate law: states
compete for incorporations and are thus incented to offer corporate codes that will appeal
to businesses.4 Companies also have an incentive to self-regulate as a competitive
response to limited available capital—like state regulators; companies will generally
1. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
2. Under modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence, however, the regulation of corporate governance
issues would justifiably fall under federal jurisdiction, so it is largely due to both tradition and federal restraint
that the federal government leaves much of the regulation of corporations to the states and other regulators, such
as stock exchanges.
3. Because of the generally flexible nature of state corporate codes, much of the regulation of
corporations by the states occurs not through statutes, but through statutory interpretation provided by state
courts. See infra Part II.B. Perhaps the best-known example of this common law tradition of regulation is the
“business judgment rule,” which holds that business decisions made in good faith and on the basis of reasonable
investigation are not actionable. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 781 (Ill. App. 1968) (holding
that a decision not to play night games at Wrigley Field was not actionable); Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383
N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1976) (holding as not actionable a decision to forego tax savings in order
to grant a dividend and thereby demonstrate an appearance of earnings).
4. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1 (1993) (“The genius of American
corporate law is in its federal organization.”).
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attempt to encourage investment by offering an attractive corporate governance structure.
In addition, as a condition to listing their securities on a stock exchange, public
companies will subject themselves to exchange listing standards. Given that investors
will often not have the time and resources to undertake a sophisticated analysis of a
company’s governance structure, and recognizing that companies will often have
competing incentives that may result in suboptimal governance structures, exchanges also
regulate via listing standards that are designed to promote investor confidence by
providing minimum standards for listed companies. The recognition by industry that
regulators—even relatively restrained federal agencies like the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)—abhor a regulatory vacuum also provides another motivation for
self regulation.5
After WorldCom, Enron, and the other turn-of-the-millennium financial scandals,
this loose structure of federal/state/exchange and self regulation was regarded by many to
be an unreliable motivator of adequate corporate governance. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 was one response to this perceived failure, and has since been the subject of
considerable academic interest, not least because it federalized several areas of corporate
law that had been left to the states or simply to the discretion of the board and
management. Another response, which has received relatively little attention, is the
increasing role of what this Article refers to as the “corporate governance industry”:
governance advisers, governance rating firms, and proxy advisers (sometimes operating
as business units of a single company).6
The corporate governance industry plays a major corporate governance policymaking role, and, because of its influence with institutional investors, effectively acts as a
voluntary corporate regulator. Some executives believe that corporate governance
industry market leader Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) may control a third or
more of the shareholder votes.7 According to a recent interview reported in the
Washington Post, John M. Connolly, president and chief executive of ISS, acknowledges
that 15%-20% of ISS clients use a service that automatically votes according to ISS
recommendations, although clients can override it.8 As a measure of influence, consider
that ISS has over 1700 institutional clients, and the clients’ assets under management
exceed $25 trillion.9 ISS claims to advise “24 of the top 25” and “81 of the top 100”
mutual funds, all “25 of the top 25” asset managers, and “17 of the top 25” public
pension funds.10 ISS advice has been cited as a decisive factor in a number of major
corporate events, including the approval of the Hewlett-Packard/Compaq merger and the
5. The industry group Business Roundtable was created, among other reasons, to reduce “unwarranted
intrusion by government into business affairs.” See Business Roundtable, About Us,
http://www.businessroundtable.org/aboutUs/history.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
6. As this Article argues below, however, the evolution of the corporate governance industry is only
partly attributable to the scandals.
7. Dean Starkman, A Proxy Adviser’s Two Sides: Some Question Work of ISS for Companies It
Scrutinizes, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2006, at D1 (citing a statement by Susan E. Wolf, vice president at ScheringPlough Corp. and chairman of the Soc’y of Corporate Sec’ys and Governance Prof’ls).
8. Id.
9. See INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., THE BUSINESS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IS GLOBAL,
http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/Locations.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2007).
10. See INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., EXPERIENCE MATTERS: A GUIDE TO SELECTING THE RIGHT PROXY
VOTING PARTNERS 9 (2007), http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/GuidetoSelectingtheRightProxyVotingPartner.pdf.
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shareholder vote that ousted Michael Eisner from his role of chairman at Walt Disney
Co.11 Another measure of the growing importance of the industry is the fact that, just five
years ago, market leader ISS was acquired for around $40 million.12 On November 1,
2006, RiskMetrics acquired ISS for an estimated $550 Million.13
The influence of ISS and other proxy advisers may increase even more with passage
of rules by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), scheduled to take effect in January
2008,14 which would eliminate broker discretionary voting in director elections.15
According to Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz attorneys David Katz and Laura McIntosh,
“an estimated 70 to 80 percent of all public companies’ shares are held in ‘street name’ . .
. by brokers . . . [and] depositories . . .” on behalf of beneficial owners,16 and under
NYSE rules brokers are given discretionary voting power over such shares only for
“routine matters”;17 if the rules under consideration are enacted, uncontested elections
would be considered “non-routine.” Katz and McIntosh argue that “[i]f, in the aftermath
of NYSE rule changes as proposed, issuers indeed are unable to contact or obtain voting
instructions from large numbers of individual shareholders, the effect will be a massive
shift of voting power from brokers to institutions, and, therefore, to proxy advisory
services such as ISS, Glass, Lewis & Co., and Proxy Governance.”18 As an indication of
how this shifts power to the corporate governance industry, Katz and McIntosh note that
a 2002 study found that “ISS recommended that shareholders vote against over 78
percent of the proposals that the authors estimated to have been determined by broker
discretionary votes.”19 While the general purpose of the new rule would be to increase
shareholder power with respect to director elections,20 the influence of the corporate
governance industry generally, and proxy advisers particularly, has prompted the NYSE
to propose a formal SEC investigation into the role of these firms in the proxy process.21
Given the industry’s tremendous influence over corporate governance and, more
directly, the proxy voting mechanism that shapes corporate governance decision-making,

11. Starkman, supra note 7. For a recent discussion of ISS’ role in hedge fund activism, see Thomas
Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L.
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=911072.
12. David S. Hilzenrath, Investor Advisor ISS Is Sold to RiskMetrics, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2006, at D1.
13. Id.
14. See Press Release, New York Stock Exch., NYSE Adopts Proxy Working Group Recommendation to
Eliminate
Broker
Voting
In
2008
(Oct.
24,
2006),
available
at
http://www.nyse.com/press/1161166307645.html?sa_campaign=/rss/newsreleases/NYSE.comRuleProposalsNe
wsReleases.
15. See PROXY WORKING GROUP, NEW YORK STOCK EXCH., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE
PROXY
WORKING
GROUP
OF
THE
NEW
YORK
STOCK
EXCHANGE
21
(2006),
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/REVISED_NYSE_Report_6_5_06.pdf [hereinafter NYSE PROXY REPORT].
16. See id. at 10.
17. Giving Proxies by Member Organization, NEW YORK STOCK EXCH. REP. § 452 (2007).
18. DAVID A. KATZ & LAURA A. MCINTOSH, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SEISMIC SHIFT IN THE
MECHANICS OF ELECTING DIRECTORS 3 (2006), http://www.realcorporatelawyer.com/pdfs/wlrk072806_02.
19. Id. at 3 (citing Jennifer E. Bethel & Stuart L. Gillan, The Impact of the Institutional and Regulatory
Environment on Shareholder Voting 2 (Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Working Paper No. 2002-002, 2002),
available at http://www.lerner.udel.edu/ccg/research_files/CCGWP2002-2.pdf).
20. Katz and McIntosh note in this respect that brokers tend to vote as recommended by management. Id.
at n.2.
21. See, e.g., NYSE PROXY REPORT, supra note 15, at 29.

DRAFT OF 7/19/2007

2007]

The Corporate Governance Industry

105

it is imperative to scrutinize the manner in which this influence is exercised. It is also
crucial to scrutinize the assumptions underlying the advice. Some observers, including
Rep. Richard Baker (R-Louisiana), have raised concerns over potential conflicts of
interest within some governance firms that cast doubt on the reliability of their proxy
advice and governance ratings.22 ISS, for example, sells advice on proxy voting and sells
corporate governance ratings, but it also provides advice to companies on how to improve
their ratings.23 Because of ISS’ market power, Rep. Baker has argued that “conflicts of
interest and a lack of competition in the industry could lead firms to provide biased
advice,”24 and a study is currently being undertaken by the Government Accountability
Office at his request.25
Additionally, governance firms may be overstepping their expertise in proxy voting
decisions,26 and in governance rating,27 in part because of their reliance on “good
governance metrics,” for which there is little evidentiary support. Erroneous governance
metrics (and indeed, a reliance on one-size-fits-all governance checklists) not only affect
important shareholder decisions and decisions on whether to invest in or divest from a
particular company, but may also have a more general, harmful effect on corporate
governance regulation. A number of academics have argued that the federal expansion
into certain corporate governance issues has significant negative consequences, including
the loss of the competitive benefits provided by the market for incorporations;28 as
opposed to a having a choice of relatively flexible enabling state laws, Sarbanes-Oxley
requires companies to adopt several specific corporate governance policies rather than
tailor their governance structures for their particular requirements. As I will argue below,
the corporate governance industry may have similarly harmful effects on the competition
for capital by pressuring companies to adopt a homogenized set of governance rules
which may be ill-suited to the companies’ respective situations.
22. See Kaja Whitehouse, U.S. Legislator Seeks Report on Corporate Vote Consultants, DOW JONES
NEWSWIRES, Oct. 5, 2006, http://www.djnewswires.com.
23. As discussed in Part II.B.1, infra, this is accomplished through an interactive web interface.
24. See Whitehouse, supra note 22.
25. Id.
26. ISS recently received criticism for its advice to reject Fifth Third Bank’s CEO, George A. Schaefer Jr.,
for reelection to the board:
On Mar. 16, Richard X. Bove of investment bank Punk Ziegel & Co. fired off a research note
calling ISS’ advice “totally inappropriate” and pointing out that Fifth Third's assets have increased
tenfold since Schaefer took over in 1990. Nell Minow, a former president of ISS who now runs
governance researcher The Corporate Library LLC, warns that ISS may create “incentive for
earnings manipulation that may not be in the shareholders' long-term interest” -- precisely the sort
of activity good governance is supposed to prevent.
Emily Thornton, ISS Looks Like It's Channeling Icahn: The Proxy Advisory Firm Says Fifth Third's CEO
Should
Go
Despite
Stellar
Governance,
BUS.
WEEK
ONLINE,
Apr.
3,
2006,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_14/b3978031.htm?campaign_id=rss_magzn.
27. See Part III, infra, discussing the limitations of ISS and other advisers’ governance ratings
methodology.
28. See, e.g., Larry Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 61 (2003) (arguing the case for new regulation in the wake of the
Enron scandal “has not been made”); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1602 (2005) (examining Sarbanes-Oxley and concluding that it
was misconceived and unlikely to improve performance).
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This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I will provide a brief review of the
existing federal, state, and exchange regulatory framework and how it has provided
sufficient space for the corporate governance industry to grow into an increasingly
influential and powerful voluntary regulator. I will then briefly describe the development
of the corporate governance industry, and will describe the major firms in the corporate
governance industry, which is composed of both non-profit and for-profit sectors. In Part
III, I will focus on problematic methodologies and policies of certain corporate
governance firms, with a view to how these methodologies and policies are influencing
companies and corporate governance practices. In Part IV, I will offer some preliminary
thoughts on whether the increasing power of the corporate governance industry should be
constrained by the SEC.
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDUSTRY

A. The Development of the Corporate Governance Industry
The development of the corporate governance industry has been dependent on two
factors. The first is structural: the existing regulatory regimes affecting corporate
governance are structured with sufficient regulatory space so that an industry providing
corporate governance advice has room to grow, but regulatory space only provides an
answer to how the corporate governance industry could develop. The second factor,
market demand from institutional investors, explains why the corporate governance
industry developed.
1. The Structure of Corporate Governance Regulation
Public company corporate governance regulation in the United States comes from
both public and private sources. Public sources include, on a state level, legislatures and
courts, and on the federal level, the SEC and, to a lesser extent, other federal agencies.29
Since its inception, the SEC has often tested the bounds of its federal mandate to regulate
merely the purchase and sale of securities.30 The SEC’s interest in corporate governance
29. For instance, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight and the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission each prescribe governance structures and rules specific to the types of companies and
industries they regulate.
30. For a comprehensive review of the SEC’s efforts to regulate corporate governance, see Roberta
Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas-The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge
of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79 (2005). Besides the SEC’s efforts, the judicial branch has also
indirectly set out limited governance rules. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines (FSG) set out general guidelines
for corporate governance, with a particular emphasis on legal compliance, in a section called “Effective
Compliance and Ethics Program.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (2006), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/2006guid/8c2_5.html. A corporation is allowed more leniency in white collar criminal
matters if the corporation can show that it had an effective ethics and compliance program. Although as a result
of the Booker and Blakely decisions the guidelines in the ethics and compliance program are viewed as
“advisory” rather than “mandatory,” they are still viewed as authoritative guidance for companies wishing to
minimize potential criminal liability risk. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 221 (2005) (holding that
the federal sentencing guidelines are merely advisory provisions that recommend, rather than require, a
particular sentencing range); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004) (holding that any fact, other than
a prior conviction, that raises the penalty beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and
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flows naturally from its mission to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient
markets, and facilitate capital formation.”31 The SEC occasionally encourages exchanges
to enact governance rules as a means to promote investor protection,32 and has also
attempted more direct regulation of governance matters, although this typically takes
place through disclosure regulation rather than explicit governance requirements. For
example, SEC rules enacted pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley require specific management
participation in the evaluation and certification of such internal controls.33 The internal
controls requirements and, more specifically, the certification of the internal controls are
in effect specific governance requirements.34
When the SEC has attempted to enact governance reform without a specific
congressional mandate, such as Sarbanes-Oxley, generally it has not fared well. The best
known case is the 1990 decision Business Roundtable v. SEC.35 Business Roundtable
dealt with an SEC rule requiring exchanges to bar the listing of a domestic corporation’s
securities if the issuer “acted disparately” to reduce the per share voting rights of existing
stockholders. The court pushed back against the SEC expansion into governance matters,
finding that the rule “directly controlled the substantive allocation of powers among
classes of shareholders,”36 and therefore exceeded the SEC’s authority under section 19
of the 1934 Act.37 Although the ruling did not entirely eliminate the ability of the SEC to
create governance rules with respect to proxy voting,38 the practical effect of the decision
for future SEC efforts to regulate governance through listing standards is that SEC
authority over corporate governance listing standards is reviewed on a case-by-case basis
with respect to a specific congressional statutory purpose.39
found beyond a reasonable doubt). See also Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Blakely, 17 FED. SENT’G
REP. 89, 93 (2004) (stating a dialogue on sentencing is overdue).
31. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Apr. 4,
2007).
32. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
33. Management’s Reports on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure
in Exchange Act Periodic Rates, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8238 & 34-47,986, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June
5, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.htm.
34. This has been especially true since the SEC began urging reporting companies to make use of the
internal controls framework of the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
(COSO). COSO has fairly specific oversight and governance mechanisms, which are more broadly applicable
than simple financial reporting controls. See COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N,
INTERNAL CONTROL—INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK (1994).
35. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
36. Id. The court concluded the following:
the Exchange Act cannot be understood to include regulation of an issue that is so far beyond
matters of disclosure (such as are regulated under § 14 of the Act), and of the management and
practices of self-regulatory organizations, and that is concededly a part of corporate governance
traditionally left to the states.
Id. at 408.
37. Id. at 406.
38. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4, 69 WASH. U.
L.Q. 565, 596-602 (1991) (examining the implications of Business Roundtable on the SEC’s regulations).
39. Special Study Group, Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate
Governance, 57 BUS. LAW. 1487, 1525 (2002). Relying in part on the authority of the Business Roundtable
decision, industry recently pushed back an SEC proposal that would, under certain circumstances, require
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Although Sarbanes-Oxley demonstrates that the federal government will enact
corporate governance regulations when it deems them to be necessary (or, perhaps when
it feels compelled to do so by public outcry), public corporate governance regulations
have been and primarily continue to be within the province of state legislatures and, to a
large degree, the state courts petitioned to interpret these regulations. State regulation,
like exchange regulation, has developed in a kind of give-and-take with both exchange
regulation and federal regulation, with perhaps more give than take. Indeed, as Mark Roe
has argued, states in general, and Delaware in particular, essentially regulate within the
limits granted by the federal government.40 As Professors Kahan and Rock have noted,41
Delaware’s legislature has been strikingly absent in the recent corporate governance
debates: “Delaware has been largely mute: no legislation; no rule-making; no criminal
investigations; few headlines.”42 An explanation for this seeming lack of interest may be
found in Delaware’s classical model of corporate law-making. Kahan and Rock note that
Delaware corporate law is largely judge-made, and that Delaware’s statutory law is
relatively narrow. Given that Delaware operates within a federalist system in which
Delaware’s regulatory powers co-exist with, and can be constrained by, the powers of the
federal government, Delaware seeks to maintain an “apolitical gloss” over its corporate
law by effectively making law only when required to do so by litigants.43 Delaware’s
companies to include in their proxy materials security holder nominees for election as director. See Letter from
Henry A. McKinnell, Chairman, The Bus. Roundtable, to Jonathan Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec.
22, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/s71903-381.pdf (providing a business
organization’s view on the SEC’s “proposal to require companies to include shareholder nominees for director
in company proxy materials under certain circumstances”). For a discussion of the suspect applicability of the
Business Roundtable decision to the shareholder access proposal, see Jill E. Fisch, Professor of Law & Dir. Of
the Center for Corp. Sec., and Fin. Law at Fordham Univ., Prepared Statement Before the SEC Roundtable
Discussion on Proposed Security Holder Director Nomination Rules (March 12, 2004), available at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dir-nominations/fisch031204.pdf; Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Comment on the SEC
Shareholder Access Proposal, 1 (Univ. of Cal., Los Angeles, Sch. of Law, Law & Econ., Research Paper No.
03-22, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=470121; SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE CORPORATE
BALLOT (Lucian Bebchuk, ed. 2005).
40. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2498-99 (2005) (discussing
Delaware’s corporate law in relation to the federal government); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117
HARV. L. REV. 588, 590 (2003) (arguing the debate over whether states are racing to the bottom or top in
corporate law governance is misconceived because of the federal government’s ability to govern issues of top
importance). The most important federal constraint on state action is perhaps the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA), which fixed the SEC’s role as the regulator of offerings of nationally
traded securities and securities of registered investment companies. Generally, however, NSMIA leaves states
jurisdiction over traditional state roles, such as common law fraud actions and most corporate governance
issues.
41. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND.
L. REV. 1573, 1574 (2005).
42. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Our Corporate Federalism and the Shape of Corporate Law 5
(Univ. of Penn. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 04-12, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=564685.
43.
Faced with the recent corporate scandals, calls for action, and Sturm und Drang, Delaware reacted
accordingly: Basically, it does nothing until cases are brought. Any more pro-active response by
Delaware actors would have threatened to undermine the political legitimacy achieved by
Delaware's commitment to the classical common law model.
Id.
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status as a front-runner in the incorporations race also explains why it does not attempt to
innovate with respect to corporate governance regulation.44
The most significant private constraints on public company corporate governance
come from the exchanges on which the companies are listed. Indeed, most externallyimposed corporate governance rules were first imposed not by the SEC or states, but by
stock exchanges via exchange listing requirements. In the early 1900s, for example, the
NYSE began requiring listed companies to distribute annual reports to investors and to
hold annual meetings. While there has been some debate on the ability of exchanges to
effectively regulate listed companies,45 exchanges continue to provide many substantive
governance rules. However, the exchanges’ ability to regulate is limited by the SEC’s
oversight of the exchanges. Despite their label of “self-regulatory organizations” (SROs),
in practice the SROs operate under significant SEC supervision, and have done so since
the inception of the Exchange Act. Congress expanded the SEC’s control over the SROs
in 1975 by granting the SEC the ability to reject or amend SRO rule changes, including
listing standards changes. Ordinarily, however, the SEC does not attempt to restrict the
exchanges’ ability to add additional or more restrictive governance requirements on listed
companies; rather, the SEC effectively restricts the exchanges’ latitude by pushing the
exchanges to synchronize standards across the exchanges, when possible.46 The SEC also
will press for higher and more restrictive standards as it deems necessary.47
Despite the many regulators overseeing the governance of public companies—the
SEC, states, and the exchanges—corporations still enjoy a great deal of flexibility in
devising substantive rules and governance structures. With state and exchange corporate
governance regulation, the lack of numerous mandatory rules is explained by market
incentives: exchanges compete with one another for listings, while states compete with
one another for incorporations. The result of this competition is a flexible set of
44. As Michael Abramowicz has argued, Delaware easily could mimic any corporate law innovation by
another state, so it does not face any real competition from other states as far as corporate law is concerned
(other states like Nevada may be attractive for other reasons, such as tax rates). Michael Abramowicz, Speeding
up the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 157 (2003).
45. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Some Problems with Stock Exchange-Based Securities Regulation, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1509, 1510-14 (1997) (addressing the proposition that regulatory authority should be applied to the stock
exchanges); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1454 (1997) (arguing benefits
of mobile capital “will be better realized through regulatory decentralization than greater centralization”); A.C.
Pritchard, Markets As Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges As Securities Fraud
Enforcers, 33 SEC. L. REV. 255, 255-57 (2001) (originally published under the same title in 85 VA. L. REV. 925,
925-27) (discussing reform aimed at class action lawsuits against corporations).
46. This effort was evident in the exchanges’ large-scale governance efforts in 2003, which culminated in
revised listing standards for the NYSE and Nasdaq. The exchanges and the SEC worked together for months to
finally arrive at a compromise on the form of the regulations to be set out in the listing standards, with the final
NYSE and Nasdaq versions identical on essentially every point.
47. The SEC worked extensively with the NYSE and Nasdaq in formulating enhanced governance listing
standards in November 2003. The new listing standards primarily deal with board composition, and include
rules setting standards for board independence, as well as standards for audit, compensation, and governance
committees. The NYSE and Nasdaq also require listed companies to disclose their corporate governance
guidelines, which must discuss director qualification standards, director responsibilities, board access to
management, director compensation, director orientation and continuing education, management succession,
and annual performance evaluations of the board. For a discussion of the listing standards and a review of the
rulemaking process, see NASD and NYSE Rulemaking: Relating to Corporate Governance, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-48,745, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 4, 2003) (addressing the proposed rule change).
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governance requirements, imposing very few mandatory governance procedures and
structures. With respect to federal regulation of corporate governance, a traditional
deference by Congress and the courts to state and exchange regulation of corporate
governance matters (Sarbanes-Oxley notwithstanding) has limited SEC efforts to create
substantive governance requirements.
2. The Market for a Corporate Governance Industry
Corporate governance inevitably receives attention and calls for its reinvention
following upheavals in the financial markets. Although the corporate governance industry
received a significant boost because of Enron and WorldCom, the seeds of the modern
corporate governance industry were sown in the 1970s, in response to the corporate
dimensions of the Watergate scandal. In response to the public outcry over Watergate and
to ward off potential SEC regulation, the Business Roundtable (an executive industry
group) began to address corporate governance issues by setting out best practices for
public companies.48 Other prominent non-profit groups also developed and continue to
provide governance guidelines, including the Council of Institutional Investors (CII) and
the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD). Although these groups often
take similar positions on various corporate governance issues, they each act as policy
vessels for management, institutional investors, and directors, respectively, and therefore
sometimes differ in their recommendations. All of the positions taken by these groups are
non-binding guidelines, and most of the guidance remains at a level of generality that
allows for considerable flexibility in governance (e.g., “small boards often work more
effectively than large boards,”49 says the Business Roundtable).50 In some cases, a group
will take a more specific position; as might be expected, this is more often the case with
the institutional investor mouthpiece, the CII. For instance, the CII recommends that all
directors be elected annually, and that directors should be elected by a majority of the
votes cast.51
More recently, quasi-governmental and international industry groups such as the
Organisation of Economic Co-opertation and Development (OECD) and the International
Corporate Governance Network (ICGN)52 have offered best practices, policy positions,

48. “The executives who created the Roundtable believed that the U.S. economy would be healthier, there
would be less unwarranted intrusion by government into business affairs, and the interest of the public would be
better served if there were more cooperation and less antagonism.” Business Roundtable, Business Roundtable
History, http://www.businessroundtable.org//aboutUs/history.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
49. BUS. ROUNDTABLE, BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 13 (2005)
[hereinafter BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE GUIDELINES].
50. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF INST. INVESTORS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICY (2006),
http://www.cii.org/policies/2006%20(April)%20CII%20Policies%20(2).pdf [hereinafter CII GUIDELINES]. CII
states that the guidelines are structures that CII “has found to be appropriate in most situations.” Id. at 2.
Business Roundtable is careful to note that “no one structure is right for every corporation.” BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE GUIDELINES, supra note 49, at 15.
51. CII GUIDELINES, supra note 50, at 2.
52. The non-binding OECD Corporate Governance Principles are designed to complement any applicable
legal requirement—they are what the OECD sees as “best practices” for multinational companies, rather than
legal rules that could conflict with state or federal law. For a comparison between these guidelines and the
OECD guidelines, see Kathryn Gordon, The OECD Guidelines (for Multinational Enterprises) and Other
Corporate Responsibility Instruments: A Comparison (OECD Working Paper on Int’l Inv., No. 2001/5, 2001),
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and other kinds of soft law in an effort to develop common standards of adequate
governance that will, among other benefits, encourage cross-border investment.53
Perhaps more significantly, the rise of the modern corporate governance movement
is tied to the increasing importance of the institutional investor. In 1965, institutional
investors held 16% of U.S. equities; by 2001, institutional investors held 61%.54 The
increasing numbers of institutional investors meant a lucrative, developing market for
corporate governance advisers. A corporate governance adviser may be able to conduct
research relatively cheaply, and spread its costs across hundreds of institutional clients.
ISS, for instance, has been known to use relatively unskilled temporary employees to
conduct governance reviews, which focus on publicly-filed SEC disclosure documents.55
Unless an institutional investor believes that it can conduct research for less, or that more
expensive but discerning research will enable it to obtain better returns (after subtracting
its own research costs), the investor may be better off outsourcing its corporate
governance research. Additionally, given the huge amount of information that is available
on issuers, through news media, sell-side analysts, and Internet sources, and the speed at
which information is disseminated, it is not surprising that institutional investors would
seek to outsource some of their research load.
The link between institutional investors and the corporate governance industry was
also strengthened by an increasing regulatory focus on proxy voting. In the 1990s the
Department of Labor advised pension funds that proxy voting constituted part of the
funds’ fiduciary duties to investors.56 In 2003, the SEC enacted rules requiring mutual
fund managers to vote proxies in the best interests of clients, and also required disclosure
of voting policies and actual votes.57
Shareholders have long attempted to exercise influence through precatory

available at http://oecd.org/dataoecd/46/36/2075173.pdf. The ICGN, however, is generally more specific in its
requirements than the OECD, which may produce conflict with certain state or exchange standards. However, in
most cases the ICGN standards simply represent a higher standard than most countries require, and opting for a
higher standard is generally not prohibited by governance regulators. For a brief discussion of the differences
between the OECD guidelines and the ICGN guidelines, see Int’l Corp. Governance Network, ICGN Statement
on
Global
Corporate
Governance
Principles,
http://www.icgn.org/organisation/documents/cgp/revised_principles_jul2005.php (last visited Apr. 3, 2007)
[hereinafter ICGN Statement]. Other significant international corporate governance guidelines, as cited by the
OECD, include the following: the Caux Principles for Business; the Global Reporting Initiative; Global
Sullivan Principles; the Principles for Global Corporate Responsibility: Benchmarks; Social Accountability
8000 (SA 8000); and the United Nations Global Compact.
53. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES (rev. 2000), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf.
54. SECS.
INDUS.
ASS’N,
SECURITIES
INDUSTRY
FACTBOOK
64
(2002),
http://www.sia.com/research/pdf/2002Fact_Book.pdf.
55. Eleanor Laise, Is This the Most Influential Man on Wall Street?, SMARTMONEY MAG., Oct. 16, 2002,
http://www.smartmoney.com/mag/index.cfm?story=oct02-influential.
56. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (2006).
57. See Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2106, 68 Fed. Reg.
6585 (Feb. 7, 2003) (adopting Investment Advisers Act Rule 206(4)-6, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2006));
Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment
Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564 (Feb. 7, 2003) (adopting Investment Company
Act Rule 30b1-4, 17 C.F.R. § 270.30b1-4 (2006), and related amendments to the applicable Investment
Company Act forms).
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shareholder resolutions,58 and these resolutions are still one of the primary means for
shareholders to influence corporate governance. However, shareholder-led governance
movements struggle against collective action problems—shareholders generally will not
make an effort to effect governance changes unless the benefits resulting from the efforts
equal or exceed the costs of such an effort. Even when such efforts are made, the benefits
may only inure to a particular shareholder or a small group of shareholders.59 However,
the corporate governance industry, primarily through the proxy voting process, is able to
present a relatively cohesive front to management and the board of directors. ISS, by
influencing perhaps a third or more of a company’s securities, may be the de facto voice
of the institutional investor.60
B. The For-Profit Governance Industry: Proxy Advisers, Governance Ratings Agencies,
and Governance Advisers
The for-profit corporate governance industry sells corporate governance advice
through a number of products, including corporate governance ratings and proxy advice.
Corporate governance ratings companies affect governance decisions in at least two
ways. First, governance policies are necessarily built into the rating company’s analysis.
Rather than advocating specific governance policies, governance ratings agencies affect
corporate governance simply by rewarding or penalizing various corporate governance
policies. Because many institutional investors, including large pension funds, use the
governance ratings to decide whether or not to invest in or divest from a company,
companies must pay attention to the ratings.
As noted above, proxy advisory work helped drive the initial development of the
corporate governance industry. ISS, the market leader, provides both governance ratings
and proxy voting recommendations. Proxy advisers generally base their decisions on
corporate governance standards that are derived from the same policies as those used to
formulate governance ratings and related governance advice. Because of the influence
proxy advisers like ISS have with institutional investors (and, as discussed below, given
that they are in some cases directly empowered by clients to vote shares according to
their policies), proxy advisers play a more direct role in effecting corporate governance
changes than firms that only rate governance.
There are about a half-dozen well-established firms in the U.S. corporate
governance industry, and a few others who operate in Asia and Europe.61 The following
58. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2006).
59. This is one of the concerns with the recent spate of hedge fund activism. While hedge funds may seek
to encourage governance changes that benefit shareholders generally, hedge fund interests may not always
coincide with other shareholders’ interests to the extent that hedge funds have a different investment horizon.
See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control (Univ.
of Penn. Law Sch. Inst. for Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 06-16, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=919881.
60. For a discussion of the influential role of the ISS as a proxy adviser, see Briggs, supra note 11, at 1415.
61. The significant U.S. market players include: the Corporate Library and its subsidiary, Board Analyst;
Glass Lewis; GovernanceMetrics International; ISS; Proxy Governance, Inc.; and the credit rating agencies,
Egan-Jones, Moody’s Inc. and Standard & Poor’s. European governance service providers include
CoreRatings/DNV and Deminor Ratings. Asian governance providers include CRISIL Ltd. (India) Governance
and Value Creation Ratings and ICRA Limited.
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sections will focus attention on the policies of the most prominent U.S. proxy advisers
and governance ratings firms.
1. Institutional Shareholder Services
ISS is the dominant firm in the corporate governance industry, and ISS affects
corporate governance decisions in several ways. The major portion (65%) of ISS’
business is proxy advisory services.62 As a proxy adviser (generally to institutional
investors, such as mutual funds), ISS reviews the various company and shareholder
proposals put up for a vote at the annual election of shareholders of various companies.
ISS will analyze the proposal and offer advice on how the advisee should vote, although
in some cases the client empowers ISS to vote on its behalf in accordance with ISS
recommendations. Because ISS has such a large clientele, both in terms of the number of
institutional and other investors that it represents, as well as in terms of the market
capitalization held by these investors, ISS’ recommendations may make the difference
between success and failure of a proposal.
While ISS’ core business is built around a standard “best practices” proxy advisory
service, it also offers specialized proxy advice for clients interested in effecting social
responsibility initiatives63 (Social Advisory Services), for public funds that would like to
be active “on issues like majority vote standard, classified boards, performance-based
equity awards, voting power dilution, ratification of auditors, corporate social
responsibility, terrorism states and other matters impacting the public good”64 (Public
Fund Advisory Services), and for clients who have a fiduciary obligation to protect plan
assets as required by the U.S. Department of Labor and the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 197465 (Taft-Hartley Advisory Services). ISS also offers customizable
proxy voting services,66 M & A analysis services,67 and international proxy voting
services.68 Additionally, ISS sells “non-recommendation research” on various social69
and international issues70 for clients that analyze proxies on a case-by-case basis.
Another component of ISS’ business model is its corporate governance ratings
service. Since 2002, ISS has rated companies with a proprietary analysis that results in a

62. See ISS’ disclosure on Form ADV (Uniform Application for Investment Adviser Registration),
available at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/NewFormADVII.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
63. Inst.
S’holder
Servs.,
Social
Advisory
Services,
http://www.issproxy.com/institutional/research/sirsresearch.jsp (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
64. Inst.
S’holder
Servs.,
Public
Fund
Advisory
Services,
http://www.issproxy.com/institutional/research/publicfund.jsp (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
65. Inst.
S’holder
Servs.,
Taft-Hartley
Advisory
Services,
http://www.issproxy.com/institutional/research/tafthartleyresearch.jsp (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
66. Inst.
S’holder
Servs.,
Custom
Proxy
Advisory
Services,
http://www.issproxy.com/institutional/research/customresearch.jsp (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
67. Inst. S’holder Servs., M&A Insight, http://www.issproxy.com/institutional/research/mainsight.jsp (last
visited Apr. 20, 2007).
68. Inst.
S’holder
Servs.,
Int’l
Proxy
Advisory
Services,
http://www.issproxy.com/institutional/research/globalresearch.jsp (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
69. Inst.
S’holder
Servs.,
Social
Advisory
Services,
http://www.issproxy.com/institutional/research/socialissues.jsp (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
70. Inst.
S’holder
Servs.,
US
and
Int’l
Governance
Research
Services,
http://www.issproxy.com/institutional/research/globalgovernanceresearch.jsp (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
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“Corporate Governance Quotient” (CGQ) for the company. ISS gathers relevant
company information primarily from SEC filings, although in some instances ISS will
obtain information directly from the company. The variables are structured so that they
can be analyzed through simple “yes” or “no” indicators (or, in some cases, simply “not
disclosed), i.e., “the Company has made a material restatement to year-end financial
results during the past 24 months for any prior period.”71
The CGQ currently covers approximately 7500 companies and is based on
approximately 65 criteria for U.S. companies and 55 criteria for non-U.S. companies.72
The variables ISS uses to analyze companies fall under four general governance areas:
board, compensation, anti-takeover, and audit. ISS has weighted the variables of each
category according to their importance to governance so that the variables under the
“board” category make up 40% of the CGQ score, and the variables under the
“compensation,” “anti-takeover,” and “audit” categories make up 30%, 20%, and 10% of
the CGQ, respectively. Although the exact variables (and how they are weighted) are
proprietary, ISS has disclosed the eight most important variables in the CGQ in terms of
their effect on the overall CGQ score:
1. The audit committee is comprised totally of independent outsiders.
2. The average annual burn rate [which measures a company’s annual cost of
granting equity to executives and employees] over the past three fiscal years is
2% or less, or is within one standard deviation of the industry mean.
3. All of the audit committee members are “financial experts,” based on the
SEC definition of “financial expert”.
4. Board is controlled by a supermajority of over 90% independent outsiders.
5. Board has only one non-independent director.
6. Directors are subject to stock ownership requirements.
7. Board is controlled by a supermajority of between 75%-90% independent
outsiders.
8. Company is incorporated in a state without any state anti-takeover
provisions.73
From time to time ISS will review the CGQ factors and add, eliminate, or change
the value and interrelationships of various factors.74 In June 2005, ISS announced an

71. INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE QUOTIENT METHODOLOGY UPDATE FACT SHEET
(2006), http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/CGQFactSheet.pdf [hereinafter CGQ UPDATE].
72. A very basic description of these criteria may be found at INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., EXPLAINING THE
CGQ
METHODOLOGY
CHANGE
PROCESS
(2005),
http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/CGQevolvingmethodologyWP.pdf [hereinafter CGQ METHODOLOGY]. A more
detailed listing of the variables (which have been updated as of June 21, 2005) may be found in Renna
Aggarwal & Rohan Williamson, Did New Regulations Target the Relevant Corporate Governance Attributes?
32 (Geo. Univ. Working Paper Series, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=859264.
73. CGQ METHODOLOGY, supra note 72.
74. ISS explains that the revision of its latest CGQ variables was spurred on by the growing body of
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increased focus on executive compensation issues and has added new variables to reflect
“new requirements [e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley related requirements], emerging best practices
and their correlation to financial performance.”75 ISS’ research also led it to revise a
number of variables “to better clarify their impact on financial performance,”76 and ISS
has eliminated six variables, either because, according to ISS, no evidence indicates that a
particular variable has any effect on firm performance, or because new regulations have

research that has attempted to find a link between corporate governance and firm performance:
A team of ISS quantitative analysts built on the work of numerous researchers. . . . An outcome of
the research review and analysis, in addition to 4,000 statistical tests run against financial metrics,
resulted in addition, modification or elimination of CGQ variables. . . . The ISS Quantitative
Analysis team used an exhaustive “bottoms up” approach to assess the rating variables, reviewing
governance data from 2002 through 2004. For each year’s data, each rating issue was statistically
tested against each of 16 performance measures that address profitability (ROIC, ROE, ROI,
EBITDA margin, etc.); valuation (Price to Book, Cash Flow, and Earnings); market (TSR,
Tobin’s Q); and, risk (Volatility and Z Score). In all, more than 4,000 statistical tests were run
over the two-year evaluation period.
The goal of the revised methodology was to align the rating variables with objective
performance measures. The underlying weights, or points, were then determined by the degree of
correlation between each factor and the various performance measures. Specifically, the higher
the rating factor correlation is to the performance measures, the relatively higher weight it has
been allocated in the revised methodology. Conversely, the lower the rating factor correlation
significance is to the performance metrics, the lower the weight assigned to that factor. The end
result is a revised group of variables whose weightings are based on those most closely correlated
with business outcomes.
Id. at 1-3 (emphasis omitted). As I discuss below, the reliability of ISS’ variables as a predictor of good
governance are the subject of significant debate.
75. Id. These variables include: related party transactions, other than the CEO (evaluates whether there are
related party transactions with directors or officers other than the CEO); financial expert (analyzes the number
of financial experts on the audit committee); performance-based compensation (awards points to companies that
grant awards based on performance criteria and disclosed hurdle rates, i.e., companies that grant indexed
options or awards not earned or vested unless specific performance measures are met are rewarded in this
category); individual director performance reviews (awards points to companies that perform periodic
performance reviews of individual directors); mandatory holding periods for options and restricted stock
(awards points to companies that require their executives to retain a meaningful portion of their earned
restricted shares or performance shares for a specified period after exercise or after the stock awards vest);
takeover defenses (awards points for companies that do not have a poison pill); and capital structure (awards
points to companies that are not authorized to issue blank check preferred stock).
76. Id. These revised variables include: board composition (awards points when at least two-thirds of
board members are independent outsiders); number of boards served on, other than CEO (this variable was
expanded to include three categories of board service of outsiders, presumably taking into consideration the fact
that, for example, service as an audit committee member is more demanding than simply serving as a board
member without committee responsibilities); chairman/CEO separation (awards points to companies that have
separated the roles of chairman and CEO and have an independent director serving as chairman); governance
guidelines (awards points for putting the company’s governance guidelines on the company web site); audit fees
(awards points for additional detail on audit fees); capital structure—dual class (reduces the penalty for dual
class capital structures where anyone can buy shares of the super-voting stock); option repricing (incorporates
recent updates to NYSE and NASDAQ listing standards that option repricing may not be implemented without
shareholder approval unless a company’s option plans specifically permit repricing); director education (awards
points if directors attended accredited programs within previous two years); and key committee independence
and board access to advisers (awards points when committees are independent and the board has access to its
own advisers).
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made a variable superfluous. The superfluous variables that have been eliminated include
variables analyzing the disclosure of a policy on auditor rotation, the company’s history
of option repricing, pension plans for non-employee directors, and corporate loans to
insiders.77 ISS dropped variables relating to director term limits and mandatory
retirement ages because it could find no link between these variables and financial
performance or risk.78
In November 2006, ISS again adjusted the CGQ to “better reflect current market
trends in corporate governance, as well as more closely align with overall ISS policies.”79
ISS now analyzes “the presence and strength of a majority vote standard for members of
a company’s board of directors,”80 penalizes companies that restate financials, penalizes
companies that have had to make a material restatement to year-end financial results for
any period and/or who have been subject to an enforcement action as a result of options
backdating,”81 and penalizes companies if one or more of its directors have been the
subject of an ISS withhold voting recommendation for either the most recent annual
meeting or the next annual meeting.82 ISS also modified existing ratings criteria,
including changes to award points if a company with a classified board has passed a
proposal to de-classify the board, but where all directors are not yet elected annually,83
and to award points if a company has a combined chairman and CEO, “but where there is
a counterbalancing governance structure in place.”84 ISS has deleted options expensing
as a ratings criterion because “it has become obsolete as a result of regulation, and is no
longer a differentiator of companies within the model.”85
Finally, another component of ISS’ business is its advisory services to companies.
The CGQ is provided to institutional investor clients, but it is also available to the subject
companies. Subject companies may, in ISS’ words, “use CGQ dynamically to evaluate
their governance structures, benchmark their governance performance and conduct peer
analysis.”86 The “dynamic” use refers to a subject company’s ability to, for a fee, use
ISSue Blueprint, a corporate governance analytic tool that allows companies to compare
governance standards to peers and against “best practices.”87 Through the web interface,
a client company may input various governance changes to test how the change would
impact the company’s CGQ. Essentially, the client clicks a box indicating that its
directors receive annual education and training on their responsibilities, for example, and
the CGQ score increases. Combine the roles of chairman and CEO and the CGQ
decreases.
ISS also offers a separate tool for compensation plans—ISSue Compass—which
similarly uses a web interface to allow a company the opportunity to test a provision with
ISS before submitting it to shareholders for approval in the proxy statement. A client
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 4.
Id.
CGQ UPDATE, supra note 72, at 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
CGQ UPDATE, supra note 72, at 2.
Id.
See CGQ METHODOLOGY, supra note 72.
Id.
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company can thus know whether or not ISS will support the compensation plan when ISS
is asked for its recommendation.
2. GovernanceMetrics International
GovernanceMetrics International (GMI) provides corporate governance ratings and
reports on nearly 4000 companies in the United States and abroad.88 It does not offer
proxy advisory services. GMI uses almost 500 data points in assessing a company’s
corporate governance. The result of the GMI analysis is a GMI rating report, which
includes a summary of the company’s overall governance score, as well as a discussion
and individual score for each of six governance broad categories: board accountability,
corporate social responsibility, executive compensation, financial disclosure and internal
controls, takeover controls and ownership base, and shareholder rights.
GMI has developed its ratings by examining SEC regulations, exchange listing
requirements, and many of the sources of corporate governance guidelines discussed
above, including the OECD, the ICGN, and the Business Roundtable. Like ISS, GMI has
produced a set of variables that are structured so that they can only produce “yes,” “no,”
or “not disclosed” answers, which GMI believes eliminates “a large degree of
subjectivity.”89 GMI obtains its information primarily through public documents and
filings. After the initial report is completed, it is sent on to the company for a final
accuracy check. GMI uses a proprietary scoring algorithm, which uses asymmetric,
geometric scoring that results in the magnification of “outliers,” so that companies with
the best practices are rewarded even more, while those with the worst practices are
subject to additional penalties.
3. The Corporate Library
Another major corporate governance analysis firm, the Corporate Library, was
founded by former ISS executives Nell Minow and Robert Monks. Generally speaking,
the Corporate Library’s analysis is less quantitative and more qualitative than ISS’ or
GMI’s analyses.90 While the Corporate Library does produce some numeric ratings based
on the adherence of a company to a set of enumerated “best practices” (which are based
primarily on the OECD’s model),91 the company also notes in its analysis that the “onesize-fits-all aspects of the best practices compliance approach [is] limited at best.”92 As a
result, the Corporate Library does not use the best practices benchmark as a component
of its analysis of the board’s effectiveness; indeed, the Corporate Library notes that it has
“assigned very low Board Effectiveness Ratings to a number of boards that rate quite
well on best practices compliance. Such was the case with the disastrous Enron board, for

88. See
GovernanceMetrics
Int’l,
Overview,
http://www.gmiratings.com/(hgwaa055h0jyiu55scbird45)/About.aspx#top (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
89. GovernanceMetrics
Int’l,
Research
Methodology,
http://www.gmiratings.com/(hgwaa055h0jyiu55scbird45)/About.aspx#methodology (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
90. For an example of a Corporate Library analysis, see its analysis of OMX, CORP. LIBRARY,
OFFICEMAX
INCORPORATED
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
PROFILE
(2006),
http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/special/misc/OfficeMax.pdf.
91. Id. at 8 (evaluating OMX with respect to a list of “best practices”).
92. Id.
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example, the clearest possible confirmation of the notion that best practice compliance
alone is simply not enough.”93
4. Glass, Lewis & Co.
Glass, Lewis & Co. (Glass Lewis) provides research and advisory services to
institutional investors through a number of products. Glass Lewis does not provide
consulting services to rated companies “except in the rare circumstance that a money
manager is a public company or a division of a public company.”94 Glass Lewis will
provide copies of its previously published research to rated companies, sometimes for a
fee.95
Like ISS, Glass Lewis provides proxy advisory services to institutional investors. It
also provides governance research, although its analyses are generally subjective and do
not result in numerical governance ratings.96 One exception is the Glass Lewis product
“Board Accountability Index” (BAI). The BAI includes all companies in the S&P 500
and indexes all S&P 500 companies through a modified market-cap weighting algorithm
that adjusts a company’s weight based on the presence or absence of five “critical
corporate governance features.”97 The BAI is based on research conducted by Professors
Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell and focuses on five entrenchment
factors that, according to their research, indicate a “statistically significant and strong
correlation, over a long period of time” with stock performance.98
5. Proxy Governance, Inc.
One relatively new corporate governance industry firm, Proxy Governance, Inc., a
proxy adviser, has determined to differentiate itself from ISS by offering a more
subjective analysis—an “issue-by-company” approach, rather than an “issue-by-issue”
approach:
Instead of reviewing proxies and recommending votes on an issue-by-issue
basis, PROXY Governance conducts its analysis and provides
recommendations on an “issue-by-company” basis. It views proxy issues in the
context of company-specific metrics, taking into account a variety of relevant
factors, such as an individual company’s financial performance relative to its
industry, its business environment, the strength of its management and
corporate strategy, and the quality of its corporate governance, among others.99

93. Id.
94. See
Glass,
Lewis
& Co. (Glass
Lewis),
Conflicts of
Interest
Disclosure,
http://www.glasslewis.com/company/disclosure.php (last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
95. Id.
96. For a sample Glass Lewis research report, see Glass, Lewis & Co., In-Depth Analysis of
Unrecognized Risks, http://glasslewis.com/downloads/overviews/yellowcard.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
97. Glass, Lewis, & Co., Board Accountability Index, http://www.glasslewis.com/solutions/bai.php (last
visited Apr. 3, 2007).
98. Id. These factors include: staggered boards, limits on shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills,
golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers. Id.
99. Proxy
Governance,
Inc.,
Recommendations
on
an
Issue-By-Company
Basis,
http://www.proxygovernance.com/content/pgi/content/issue_by_issue.shtml (last visited Apr. 3, 2007)
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Proxy Governance also states that “[m]uch proxy analysis today is based on
methodology that assumes a specific set of corporate governance initiatives is or is not
inherently beneficial to shareholders, and that a specific conclusion regarding a particular
issue should be applied ‘across-the-board’ to the voting of all corporations’ proxies.”100
The company notes that a “‘one-size-fits-all’ approach may result in poor decisions
on issues that genuinely impact long-term shareholder value.”101 As I will discuss below,
this method has significant advantages over a “one-size-fits-all” approach, although such
an approach is undoubtedly more time-consuming and costlier.
6. Morningstar, Egan-Jones and other Credit Ratings Agencies
Morningstar, the mutual fund ratings firm,102 has also produced a new “Stewardship
Grade” for stocks.103 The grade is derived from three broad criteria: “transparency”
(accounting practices and overall financial disclosure); “shareholder friendliness” (such
as the presence of insider-controlled share classes, takeover defenses, combined
CEO/chairman role, and related-party transactions); and “incentives, ownership, and
overall stewardship” (compensation and whether the subject firms have “consistently
treated shareholders with respect, and which we think will continue to do so.”)104 The
Stewardship Grades are absolute, rather than relative with respect to an industry peer
group.
Credit ratings firms Egan Jones and Standard & Poor’s (S&P) have also entered the
corporate governance business. Egan-Jones has a stand-alone proxy advisory business,
Egan-Jones Proxy Services, which, like Proxy Governance, does not adhere to a “onesize-fits-all” policy. While stating that “[v]oting recommendations generally follow
along prescribed voting guidelines”, the firm also notes that “each proxy proposal is
unique and is given individual attention by our research staff. We do not vote according
to a book of voting principles enumerating a canned predetermined response to every
possible situation without respect to the specifics at hand." 105
S&P produces a “Corporate Governance Score” for S&P 500 companies, which
covers approximately 100 criteria in four main categories: ownership structure,
shareholder rights and stakeholder relations, disclosure and audit issues, and board
structure and effectiveness.106 S&P also provides tailored research as requested by its
clients. S&P’s share of the corporate governance market is rather low. Two other major
credit ratings agencies, Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. and Fitch Ratings Ltd., also

(emphasis omitted).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Morningstar has also produced governance ratings for mutual funds. See Kristen French, Morningstar
Does Its Part for Corporate Governance Reform, FINANCIAL-PLANNING.COM, May 24, 2004,
http://www.financial-planning.com/pubs/fpi/20040527104.html.
103. Pat Dorsey, Introducing Stewardship Grade for Stocks: Find Shareholder-Friendly Firms with Our
New
Grading
System,
MORNINGSTAR.COM,
Feb.
7,
2005,
http://news.morningstar.com/article/article.asp?id=126900&_QSBPA=Y.
104. Id.
105. EGAN JONES PROXY SERVICES, ABOUT OUR SERVICES, (2007) http://www.ejproxy.com/services.aspx..
106. STANDARD & POOR’S, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SCORES - CRITERIA, METHODOLOGY AND
DEFINITIONS
(2002),
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.article/2,1,1,0,1021558139012.html.
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analyze corporate governance as part of their overall credit rating services but do not
currently offer stand-alone governance ratings services.
III. CONCERNS WITH THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDUSTRY
There are three broad areas of concern with business practices in the corporate
governance industry (though not all firms in the industry exhibit each of these problems).
First, a number of commentators have expressed concern over the potential for conflicts
if governance analysts also serve as governance consultants. Second, ISS and some of its
competitors impose on companies (through proxy recommendations or through ratings
pressure) a number of governance standards for which there is limited or no evidentiary
support and in some cases may be inversely correlated with improved firm
performance.107
A third and related concern is that, to the extent that the particular best practices
amount to a “one-size-fits-all” model, the board and management are effectively denied
the ability to experiment with various governance structures in accordance with their
corporate governance roles. In this sense, the corporate governance industry may, by
discouraging tailored or innovative governance structures, reduce some of the
competitive benefits made possible by a flexible and enabling regulatory structure. I
discuss each of these concerns below.
A. Conflicts of Interest
A few governance advisers, and ISS in particular, have also been criticized because
of perceived conflicts of interest.108 The concern stems from ISS’ advisory work for both
the subject company and the company’s shareholders.109 This concern has two roots.
First, ISS is providing both governance ratings and advice on how to improve the
governance score—the governance adviser administering the test will also provide the
answer key to those willing to purchase it. Observers have wondered whether this allows
companies to effectively “game” the governance ratings, so long as they are willing to
pay the price of the service.110
Second, in the case of ISS, the governance adviser also serves as a proxy adviser,
which creates a concern that ISS’ recommendation in a proxy matter may be affected by
whether or not the subject company purchases other services from ISS, such as
governance advice. Both of these potential conflicts of interest bear some similarities to
the role (now reduced, but not wholly eliminated, by Sarbanes-Oxley) played by
accounting firms as both auditors and advisers. In the case of auditors and governance
advisers, an outside firm retained to provide an independent analysis of the subject
company has built into its business model the provision of other services to the subject
107. See, e.g., infra note 128 and accompanying text. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that ISS or
one of its competitors could make such an error because, among other possible reasons, it relied on inadequate
research or because, for whatever reason, it promoted a social responsibility issue as a governance issue.
108. See, e.g., Starkman, supra note 7.
109. As discussed in Part II.B.1, supra, ISS has created separate business units for its corporate and
investor advisory businesses in an effort to reduce potential conflicts.
110. See Troy Wolverton, A Warning About eBay's Options ‘Giveaway,’ THESTREET.COM, June 16, 2003,
http://www.thestreet.com/stocks/troywolverton/10093761.html.

DRAFT OF 7/19/2007

2007]

The Corporate Governance Industry

121

company. Certainly, the nature and regulation of public company audits is much different
from governance rating. For example, public company auditors are retained by the
company (under the direction of the audit committee and with approval of the
shareholders), whereas governance ratings are initiated by governance ratings companies
and paid for by interested shareholders. However, even if corporate governance firms are
not retained by the subject company to provide governance ratings, the fact that the
subject companies may retain the governance ratings agency for other services (such as
compensation plan advice) creates a potential conflict of interest. By using objective
measures, however, a governance rating agency may more plausibly claim that its
governance analysis is not affected by the provision of other services. The persistence of
objective measures, despite their dubious reliability as a measure of adequate corporate
governance, thus may be explained as a defensive structure against such a conflict of
interest, or at least as a defense against claims of such a conflict.
The potential for conflicts where a company serves as both adviser and rater has not
been missed by the largest consumers of corporate governance advice: large, institutional
investors, including pension funds, have raised concerns and, in some cases, switched
advisers over conflicts issues. For example, Missouri’s $8 billion pension fund ended its
relationship with ISS because it decided it would rather do business with “an organization
that at least has the appearance of undivided loyalty to . . . clients.”111 Likewise, Ohio’s
$69 billion and Colorado’s $34 billion public employees’ retirement systems chose ISS
rival Glass Lewis over ISS in part because Glass Lewis appeared to be “free from any
appearance of conflict,”112 while ISS may have been compromised by “actual or
perceived conflicts due to corporate consulting.”113
B. Governance Ratings Methodologies
This section focuses on the ratings methodologies used by ISS, GMI, and other
governance advisers and reviews recent literature that considers whether the evidence
matches up with the advice provided by the corporate governance industry. Many of the
concerns raised here will also be applicable to proxy advisory work, given that a firm
providing both proxy advice and governance ratings will align both on a common set of
governance policies (although, as noted above, ISS clients may opt for customized proxy
advice).114 ISS may decline to vote in favor of a director, for example, because the board
did not adopt a shareholder resolution that received a majority vote of the shareholders,
or because the director nominee serves on more than six public company boards.115 Note,
111. Starkman, supra note 7 (citing Letter from Gary Findlay, Executive Dir., Miss. State Employees’ Ret.
Sys., to Inst. S’holder Servs. (2004)).
112. Id. (referencing statement issued by Colorado Public Employees’ Ret. Ass’n).
113. Id. (citing Cynthia Richson, Corporate Governance Officer, Ohio Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys.).
114. See, e.g., supra note 75 and accompanying text.
115. INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., ISS 2007 U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES CONCISE SUMMARY 1 (2006),
http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/2007%20USConciseSummaryGuidelines.pdf. ISS will also consider firm
performance in proxy voting, even when the company has strong CGQ scores. ISS recently received criticism
for its advice to reject Fifth Third Bank’s CEO, George A. Schaefer Jr., for reelection to the board:
On Mar. 16, Richard X. Bove of investment bank Punk Ziegel & Co. fired off a research note
calling ISS’ advice “totally inappropriate” and pointing out that Fifth Third’s assets have
increased tenfold since Schaefer took over in 1990. Nell Minow, a former president of ISS who
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however, that proxy advice is not necessarily based on a corporate governance rating, but
common policies (unless otherwise specified by a client) will be applied to proxy advice
and governance ratings.
As the corporate governance industry has studied and advised various “best
practices,” academics have been analyzing the relation between “best practices” advice
and firm performance. The question of whether corporate governance matters is often
rhetorically posed—I suspect that virtually all scholars, investors, managers, and
directors would agree that it matters at least with respect to endogenously selected
practices and structures (although intuitively it seems likely that very poor corporate
governance practices might correlate more reliably with substandard financial
performance than compliance with best practices would correlate with superior
performance). Professors Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell, among others,
have instead asked the following questions: What matters in corporate governance?116
What are the appropriate structures and mechanisms of corporate governance for a given
company?117 How should these structures and mechanisms be evaluated?118 Which
structures and mechanisms are reliable indicators of good governance and superior firm
performance (if any truly are), and which are not?119 While academic research on
corporate governance is in relatively early stages, the research has produced helpful, if
somewhat contradictory, results.
Some corporate governance advisers are more susceptible to criticisms of their
governance advice and ratings methodology because they rely primarily on quantitative
methodologies (a kind of “check-the-box,” “one-size-fits-all” approach) to analyze
subject companies. Such advisers are tied to a set of metrics, which, because they
produce a binary and in some cases a trinary output (“yes,” “no,” or “not disclosed”),
may not capture relevant nuances in corporate governance policies and behaviors.
Further, to the extent that such metrics are held to apply to a wide range of companies,
which may have an equally wide range of appropriate corporate governance structures
and mechanisms, the metrics provide a limited and crude analytical tool. Corporate
governance providers who rely on qualitative analyses, or a combination of quantitative
and qualitative methodologies, on the other hand, may argue that while metrics provide a
baseline, further qualitative evaluation allows the adviser to refine its analysis of a
company’s corporate governance. Whether such qualitative analysis is indeed superior to
a quantitative approach will likely become more clear as ratings provided by each type of
adviser are compared to actual results attributable to corporate governance actions and
policies. Clearly, advisers who engage in qualitative analysis already believe that their

now runs governance researcher The Corporate Library LLC, warns that ISS may create
“incentive for earnings manipulation that may not be in the shareholders’ long-term interest” -precisely the sort of activity good governance is supposed to prevent.
Analysis & Commentary, ISS Looks Like It’s Channeling Icahn: The Proxy Advisory Firm Says Fifth Third's
CEO Should Go Despite Stellar Governance, BUS. WEEK ONLINE, Apr. 3, 2006,
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_14/b3978031.htm?campaign_id=rss_magzn.
116. Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance? (Harvard Law Sch., John M.
Olin Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 491, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=593423.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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approach yields more accurate results (as evidenced, for example, by the Corporate
Library’s mention of its low rating for Enron, despite Enron’s high rating based on purely
quantitative factors).
On the other hand, a review of recent finance literature suggests that a number of the
governance metrics selected by ISS and GMI do not reliably predict firm performance.
As used in this Article, the term “firm performance” is construed quite broadly, so that
good firm performance may include not just superior returns on equity or assets, but
whether the company is able to avoid problems that may be attributable to corporate
governance failures, such as accounting restatements and lawsuits.120
While the use of a set of one-size-fits-all governance criteria is obviously a concern
with governance ratings, the problem is also apparent in the rather rigid review of various
proxy proposals. For instance, ISS operates under the presumption that certain proposals
should or should not be recommended—for example, there is a very strong presumption
in favor of a proposal to alter company articles and bylaws to allow for annual election of
directors.121 In order to rebut this presumption, management will spend a great deal of
time and effort to make its case to ISS and institutional shareholders.122 While the annual
election of directors arguably encourages director accountability, it also may jeopardize
the interests of ISS’ core client base—large institutional investors. For instance, much of
the activism by hedge funds appears to be event-driven rather than performancedriven,123 and hedge funds may be hoping to effect a change of control (or at least
sufficiently tip the balance) so as to cause an event that will inure to the benefit of the
hedge funds, but that may be detrimental to many of the institutional investors. Annual
election of directors will generally make it easier for a hedge fund or “pack” of hedge
funds to gain the seats it needs to instigate the event. And, as Thomas Briggs has noted,
“in contested board elections and other corporate disputes, ISS has become increasingly
willing to support dissident candidates and positions,”124 and ISS support generally
correlates with success of the dissident effort.125

120. Lynn Stout has argued that increasing share price is not the only (and not even the best) predictor of
good firm performance. Lynn A. Stout, Share Price as a Poor Criterion for Good Corporate Law (Univ. of
Cal., Los Angeles, Sch. of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 05-7, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=660622.
121. See INST. S’HOLDER SERVS., ISS 2006 U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES SUMMARY (2005),
http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/US2006SummaryGuidelines.pdf (describing the procedure and substance ISS
considers when voting).
122. See, e.g., Starkman, supra note 7 (describing management’s resistance to ISS).
123. See Audio file: Comments of Scott J. Davis at the 26th Annual Ray Garrett Jr. Corporate and
Securities Law Institute, held by Northwestern University School of Law (May 4, 2006) (on file with author).
124. Briggs, supra note 11, at 14.
125. Id. Similar results were found in a study by members of the SEC’s staff in a 2006 study. The authors,
which included the Chief Economist and Director of the SEC’s Office of Economic Analysis, concluded that
“empirical evidence shows that the [proxy advisor] recommendations are good predictors of [proxy] contest
outcomes; for example, a recommendation that supports the dissident is a good predictor that the dissident will
prevail. The findings are associated with both ‘influence’ and ‘prediction’ hypotheses on the role of the advisorthat the recommendation either influences or helps investors to predict the outcome, or both.” Chester S. Spatt,
Chief Economist and Director, Office of Economic Analysis, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at Rutgers
University Conference on “Improving Corporate Governance: Markets vs. Regulation:” Shareholder Voting and
Corporate
Governance:
Economic
Perspectives
(April
20,
2007),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch042007css.htm (citing C. R. Alexander, M. Chen, D. Seppi and C.
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Board independence, long a major focus of the corporate governance industry, is
now required of larger public companies through NYSE and Nasdaq listing standards.
Although the corporate governance industry and regulators have spoken definitively on
the issue, board independence may not be a cure for governance failures. Indeed, recent
research suggests that board independence may be negatively correlated with operating
performance.126 Likewise, corporate governance industry firms have encouraged the
separation of the CEO and chairman roles. While separating the roles does not guarantee
avoiding poor governance (for example, Enron and WorldCom had separated these
roles), it is also true that no study clearly indicates a correlation between firm
performance and the duality of the CEO and the chairman.127
Governance ratings firms and proxy advisory firms will naturally rely on certain
rules of thumb to help evaluate corporate governance. My concern is not with rules of
thumb, but rather, in the case of proxy advisory work, with what seem to be strong
presumptions based on insufficient evidence, which must be vigorously rebutted by the
company. In the case of governance ratings, however, often there is not merely a
presumption but also a hard metric by which every company is judged. Professor Jeffrey
Sonnenfeld has argued that the metrics used in the ratings analyses are based heavily on
“Wall Street superstitions” and “clichés and myths, rather than on genuine research.”128
The argument against ISS’ and GMI’s analysis is not that all or even most of the
variables are inappropriate. Indeed, Sonnenfeld recognizes that some of the quantitative
methodology employed by ISS and GMI relies on research-proven measures of effective
governance. However, “ISS and GMI [then] blend these dimensions with superstitious
ones to create checklists of highly stringent standards, regardless of the genuine research
foundation to support them.”129 For example, Sonnenfeld argues that most of the studies
that have been cited in support of the proposition that certain board structures correlate
with effective governance, in fact, do not examine the impact of board structure but
instead focus on other variables. Citing Sunil Wahal and Michael Smith, Sonnenfeld
argues that those studies which attempt to isolate the impact of board structure on
company performance have not found a strict correlation.130 Since Sonnenfeld’s article,
some more recent studies do suggest some relation between board structure and corporate
governance.131 Nonetheless, aside from particular governance requirements mandated by
Spatt, The Role of Advisory Services in Proxy Voting (2006) (unpublished manuscript)).
126. SANJAI BHAGAT & BRIAN BOLTON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE (2006),
http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/emplibrary/Corporate_Governance-Performance.pdf. Recent research by Professor
William Sjostrom has also questioned the justifications for annual elections of directors. See William Sjostrom,
The Case Against Mandatory Annual Director Elections and Shareholders’ Meetings, 74 TENN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ abstract=907474.
127. See, e.g., B. Ram Baliga et al., CEO Duality and Firm Performance: What’s the Fuss?, 17 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 41 (1996); James A. Brickley et. al., Corporate Leadership Structure: On the Separation of the
Positions of CEO and Chairman of the Board (Simon Sch. of Bus., Working Paper FR 95-02, 1995), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6124.
128. Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Good Governance and the Misleading Myths of Bad Metrics, ACAD. MGMT.
EXEC., Feb. 2004, at 108, 108.
129. Id. at 108-09.
130. Id. at 128, at 109 (citing Sunil Wahal, Pension Fund Activism and Firm Performance, 31 J. FIN. &
QUANT. ANALYSIS 1 (1996) and Michael P. Smith, Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence
from CalPERS, 51 J. FIN. 227 (1996)).
131. See Aggarwal & Williamson, supra note 72; David F. Larcker et al., How Important is Corporate
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Sarbanes-Oxley, these studies do not investigate the effect of each component that might
go into a construct of “board structure.” Current research suggests that while there is a
correlation between some aspects of board structure and effective governance, it is
unclear whether many other aspects of board structure are relevant to firm performance.
For example, while the number of board members may be relevant in determining an
effective corporate governance structure (e.g., three board members are too few,
seventeen generally are too many), the number of board members who are independent,
the number of board members who qualify as financial experts, or the number of public
boards on which these directors serve may not be relevant.
In a more recent study, Professors Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell analyzed the
relationship between corporate governance provisions dealing with entrenchment and
shareholder value. Bebchuk notes that much of the research on the effects of various
governance structures examines one or more governance provisions in isolation, without
controlling for the large universe of other governance provisions.132 For example,
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell note that a set of studies examining whether the adoption of
a poison pill133 or a golden parachute134 affected stock prices did not properly take into
account that “[w]hen a firm adopts a poison pill or a golden parachute . . . its stock price
might be influenced not only by the expected effect of the poison pill or the golden
parachute but also by inferences that investors make as to management’s private
information about the likelihood of a bid.”135 Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell also note that
“these studies did not control for whatever governance provisions the firms adopting the
poison pill or golden parachute had.”136
While Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell argue that governance structure matters, they
also note that
[A] “kitchen sink” approach of shareholder advisory firms might not be best.
Among a large set of governance provisions, the provisions of real significance
are likely to constitute only a limited and possibly small subset. Pressuring
firms to improve their index could be counter-productive when the index gives
weight to many innocuous or even beneficial provisions and correspondingly
under-weights provisions that are in fact quite harmful to shareholders. And
governance quality could well be measured more accurately by using a smaller
index based on the provisions that do matter than by using a broader index that
counts many provisions that do not in fact matter and only serve to introduce
noise. Thus, investment decisions and governance improvements could be
better served by an approach that seeks to identify and focus on key harmful

Governance? (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=595821.
132. Bebchuk et al., supra note 116, at 13 (citing Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H. Malatesta, The Wealth
Effects of Second-Generation State Takeover Legislation, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 291 (1989), and Mick Swartz, The
Massachusetts Classified Board Law, 22 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 29 (1998)).
133. Id. at 14 (citing Michael Ryngaert, The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth, 20 J.
FIN. ECON. 377 (1988)).
134. Id. (citing Richard A. Lambert & David F. Larcker, Golden Parachutes, Executive Decision-Making,
and Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 179 (1985)).
135. Id. (citing John C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific
Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271 (2000)).
136. Id.
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provisions rather than attempt to count all the trees in the governance forest.137
To restate this conclusion a bit more bluntly, good governance analysis may not be
so much a matter of examining whether a company adheres to a list of “best practices,”
but might more profitably entail an examination of whether a firm is engaged in bad or
“worst” practices. It is also worth noting that if Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell are right that
fewer provisions matter, the value added by the corporate governance industry is reduced.
If the information which most accurately reflects governance risk is less expensive to
assemble and analyze, there should be a correspondingly decreased interest in
outsourcing such research.
Other recent research also calls into question much of the advice offered by
corporate governance industry. A 2005 study by Professors Larcker, Richardson, and
Tuna138 analyzed the effect on firm performance of a number of corporate governance
indicators falling into “seven general categories: characteristics of the board of
directors,139 stock ownership by executives and board members,140 stock ownership by
institutions,141 stock ownership by activist holders,142 debt and preferred stock
holdings,143 compensation mix variables,144 and anti-takeover devices.”145
137. Bebchuk et al., supra note 116, at 5.
138. Larcker et al., supra note 131.
139. Id. (manuscript at 6). Under each of these categories, respectively, Larcker et al. reviewed
the number of meetings for the audit committee, compensation committee, and the total board . . .
, number of directors serving on the compensation committee, audit committee, and the total
board . . . , fraction of board comprised of insider (executive) directors . . . , fraction of the
compensation committee and audit committee that is comprised of affiliated directors . . . ,
indicator variables equal to one if the chairperson of the compensation committee and audit
committee is affiliated and zero otherwise . . . , the fraction of outside directors and affiliated
directors that serve on four or more boards . . . , [and the fraction of inside directors that serve on
two or more boards,] fraction of outside, affiliated, and inside directors that are older than 70 . . . ,
an indicator variable equal to one if there is a lead director (an outside director that can call
meetings of all outside directors in executive session) on the board and zero otherwise . . . , an
indicator variable equal to one if an internal executive holds the position of chairperson of the
board and zero otherwise, and the fraction of affiliated and outside directors that were appointed
by existing insiders . . . .
Id. (manuscript at 6-7).
140. Id. (manuscript at 6).
[Larcker et al.’s] board and executive ownership variables are the fraction of outstanding shares
held by the average outside director . . . , fraction of outstanding shares held by the top executive .
. . , fraction of outstanding shares held by the average executive director after excluding the
holdings of the top executive . . . , and fraction of outstanding shares held by the average affiliated
director . . . .
Id. (manuscript at 8).
141. “Institutional ownership” is measured as the fraction of outstanding shares owned by block-holders,
number of block-holders, and shareholding of the largest institutional owner. Larcker et al., supra note 131
(manuscript at 8).
142. The “activist” variables are measured using the number of activist institutions holding shares and the
fraction of outstanding shares held by activist institutions. Id. (manuscript at 9).
143. The role of debt as a governance mechanism is measured using the ratio of book value of debt
(Compustat data item 9 plus data item 34) to the market value of equity (Compustat data item 199 multiplied by
data item 25) and ratio of book value of preferred equity (Compustat data item 130) to the market value of
equity (Compustat data item 199 multiplied by data item 25). Id. (collecting data from Standard & Poor’s, Data
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In the study, Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna tried to combine the factors in different
ways in order to test the significance of various governance structures. The authors of the
study start with the proposition that governance matters; indeed Tuna states that: “[w]e
set the study up to err on the side of, ‘The relationship [between governance measures
and good performance] is there.’”146 However, Tuna notes:
[W]e can’t even find it when we do that. We biased the analysis in favor of
finding something . . . [but t]he structural indicators just don’t seem to have that
much ability to explain whether companies have to do accounting restatements,
whether they’re selling at a higher multiple, whether they’re manipulating
earnings and things like that.147
Discussing the study, Larcker observes that “[l]ots of people are coming up with
governance scorecards. . . . They’re coming up with best practices and selling this stuff.
As far as we can tell, there’s no evidence that those scorecards map into better corporate
performance or better behavior by managers.”148 Generally speaking, good governance
may affect firm performance, but it is not clear that the variables selected by governance
ratings agencies are the appropriate metrics to test and promote good firm performance.
The confusion over the appropriate variables is also underlined by Brown and
Caylor in a 2005 study149 commissioned by ISS.150 Brown and Caylor created a measure
of corporate governance, Gov-Score, based on an ISS dataset that covers 51 provisions or
attributes falling into eight general categories:151 audit, board of directors,
charter/bylaws, director education, executive and director compensation, ownership,
progressive practices, and state of incorporation.152 Brown and Caylor then tested the
Gov-Score attributes’ correlation with two measures of operating performance: return on
equity and return on assets.153 Although their research indicates that that better governed
firms are relatively more profitable, they also found that only ten governance provisions
were significantly and positively related to operating performance,154 a finding that
Services Compustat, http://www.standardandpoors.com (last visited Apr. 3, 2007)).
144. “Compensation mix variable” is the fraction of total annual CEO compensation that is earned by
exceeding accounting targets in performance plans and annual bonus. Id. (manuscript at 9-10).
145. The “anti-takeover” variables are measured using indicator variables regarding whether a firm has a
staggered (or classified) board of directors, requires a supermajority vote for a business combination, is
incorporated in a state with relatively greater protections to incumbent management (e.g., PA, OH, MA, or WI),
has unequal voting rights across shareholders or dual classes of stock, and has a poison pill or where stock
purchases can be made at substantial discounts by existing shareholders if a hostile takeover attempt is made on
the firm.
146. Wharton Sch., Univ. of Pa., Corporate Governance by the Numbers: It Just Doesn’t Work, Sept. 22,
2004, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=1041.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 3 (Dec. 7,
2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=586423.
150. See Jay W. Eisenhofer & Gregg S. Levin, Does Corporate Governance Matter to Investment Returns?,
in CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT (Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., No. 57, 2005), available at
http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/CorporateAccountabilityReport.pdf.
151. Brown & Caylor, supra note 149, at (manuscript 3).
152. Id. (manuscript at 1).
153. Id. (manuscript at 13).
154. Id. These attributes are the following: nominating committee comprised solely of independent outside
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supports the “noise” theory described by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell.155 Brown and
Caylor’s research also supports Sonnenfeld’s contention that while some governance
attributes are demonstrably relevant to firm performance, many others are perhaps
inserted in governance indices because of Wall Street “myths” that such attributes are
relevant.
Sanjai Bhagat and Brian Bolton’s research on the relation of various measures of
governance to firm performance indicates that “better governance as measured by Brown
and Caylor, and the Corporate Library is not significantly correlated with better
contemporaneous or subsequent operating performance.”156 They also find that board
independence is negatively correlated with contemporaneous and subsequent operating
performance; as they state, “This is especially relevant in light of the prominence that
board independence has received in the recent NYSE and NASDAQ corporate
governance listing requirements.”157 Perhaps most interestingly, Bhagat and Bolton find
that director stock ownership is positively related to both future operating performance
and to the probability of disciplinary management turnover in poorly performing firms.
Bhagat and Bolton suggest that perhaps “a single board characteristic [might] be as
effective a measure of corporate governance as indices that consider multiple measures of
corporate charter provisions, management compensation structure, and board
characteristics.”158 The fact that the Corporate Library’s measures, like the Brown and
Caylor measures (which were based on ISS variables), were not a better predictor of firm
performance suggests that even a more detailed, issuer-specific analysis of corporate
governance still must rely on governance heuristics and, like ISS’ approach, may not
systematically reveal marketable information with respect to firm performance.
Finally, a study by N. K. Chidambaran, Darius Palia, and Yudan Zheng challenges
the causal link on which much of the corporate governance industry is based: the
connection between corporate governance changes and corporate performance.159 The
authors note that a number of studies have found good governance measures to be
positively correlated with firm performance, which has led to the assumption that the
adoption of “good governance” measures will cause a firm’s performance to increase.160
In constructing their study to analyze this assumption, Chidambaran, Palia, and Zheng
directors; compensation committee comprised solely of independent outside directors; company not authorized
to issue blank check preferred stock; non-employees do not participate in company pension plans; at least one
board member has participated in an ISS accredited director education program; average options granted in the
past three years as a percent of basic shares outstanding did not exceed three percent; auditors ratified at the
most recent annual meeting; company expenses stock options; directors required to submit their resignations
upon a change in job status; and no former chief executive officer serves on board. Id.
155. Bebchuk, supra note 116, at 5 (stating that “governance quality could well be measured more
accurately by using a smaller index based on the provisions that do matter than by using a broader index that
counts many provisions that do not in fact matter and only serve to introduce noise”).
156. BHAGAT & BOLTON, supra note 126, at 5.
157. Id. Note however that board independence is proposed as a disciplinary device, and not necessarily as
a performance enhancement device. However, disciplinary and agency cost-reducing measures are at base
designed to keep managers from shirking or siphoning funds away from the corporation, and at least in this
basic sense are tied to firm performance.
158. Id. at 28.
159. N. K. Chidambaran et al., Does Better Corporate Governance ‘Cause’ Better Firm Performance? 2
(March, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=891556.
160. Id. (manuscript at 8).
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“‘stack the deck’ in support for the hypothesis that better governance leads to better firm
performance.”161 Using a number of governance changes, including three measures
based on the board of directors, five measures of pay-performance sensitivity, two
measures of shareholder rights, institutional ownership, and CEO turnover, they find that
measures thought to create better governance do not lead to better performance.162 The
authors note that “[w]e do not interpret our findings that good governance does not lead
to better performance to imply that governance is irrelevant but rather that firms are
endogenously optimizing their governance structure in response to observable and
unobservable firm characteristics,” noting, as Roberta Romano did in her critique of
Sarbanes-Oxley, that “a blanket policy prescription that mandates specific governance
provisions in all firms is not optimal.”163
More specific research is justified by these results, and undoubtedly many
academics are attempting to provide a clearer picture of the importance of corporate
governance to firm performance. More research is needed on the particular variables used
by ISS, GMI, and other governance ratings agencies, as well as the interrelationship and
weighting of these variables in the creation of the final governance score.164 One very
positive aspect of the corporate governance industry, however, is that because each
adviser employs a different methodology to arrive at proxy and investment advice,
scholars will also be able to continue to construct testable hypotheses on what might
matter in corporate governance, and whether an “issue-by-company” approach such as
that taken by Proxy Governance yields better returns than ISS’ advice, and if so, whether
it overcomes any cost differences between the services.
Another methodology concern, which is perhaps not limited to checklist governance
raters, is a practice this Article will refer to as “methodology churn.” Corporate
governance ratings firms continually update and retool their services, in part to remain
competitive and be at the cutting edge of governance knowledge, but perhaps also
because it is simply good business. Every time a new governance fashion appears, a
governance ratings agency can retool and advertise the need for companies and
shareholders to respond to the change. Methodology churn will ultimately sell more
services, whether through additional governance advice, software access, or the purchase
of reports. But why not wait until the knowledge of a particular governance structure
becomes more certain before advocating say, majority voting for director elections? The
answer may be simply that it does not make good business sense to wait for evidence to
support governance claims when money can be made advocating them right now.
Methodology churn and unproven governance metrics raise even more concerns when a
firm, like ISS, is granted voting power by many clients. Perhaps a third or more of a
company’s outstanding shares may be automatically voted in favor of fashionable or
intuitively appealing yet unproven governance constructs in the form of a shareholder
resolution. If another 20% of the shareholders agree with ISS’ assessment, the proposal
has a majority. The board is not obligated to go along with the shareholders, but if the
161. Id. (manuscript at 43).
162. Id. (manuscript at 44).
163. Id.
164. Much of this latter research is dependent on the release of proprietary scoring models to researchers,
which is probably too much to reasonably expect. I believe that it is reasonable, however, to expect the in-house
analysts at governance ratings agencies to conduct such research.
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board does not, ISS may not support the directors in the following year’s election, based
on their refusal to adopt a shareholder resolution approved by a majority of the
shareholders.
Despite the lack of strong evidence linking corporate governance to superior
performance, the corporate governance industry continues to enjoy tremendous
influence.165 What explains this? A large part of the explanation is that, as noted above,
federal rules require pension funds and mutual funds to vote proxies in the best interests
of their investors, and as fiduciaries these funds are compelled to perform due diligence
with respect to proxy voting.166 This perhaps best explains the fact that ISS was
purchased five years ago for $40 million and sold in November 2006 for $550 million.167
Granted, funds may use the ratings services merely as one part of their overall
governance analysis—they buy the report as part of a diligence process, but do not
necessarily follow the advice.168 While that may be true for most institutions, however,
that is not the case for the 15%-20% of ISS clients that have outsourced not only their
governance analysis to a ratings firm, but also their proxy voting responsibilities. If up to
a third of U.S. equities are indeed voted in accordance with ISS advice, we see another
explanation for the corporate governance industry’s influence in the comments of
Richard Koppes, former general counsel for the California Public Employees’ Retirement
System (CalPERS): “an institution voting against the ISS recommendation better have a
pretty good reason.”169 Following the advice of governance experts may provide
“criticism insurance”170—a fund following ISS advice has no burden of proof with
respect to a particular proxy vote. Further, it seems unlikely that a fund following the
expert advice of ISS or another proxy adviser would be found to have breached its
fiduciary duties.
The uncertain relationship between governance metrics and firm performance may
suggest that the project of reducing good governance to metrics is misguided. Indeed, it is
telling that although the corporate governance industry has argued that good governance
is related to superior firm performance, governance analysis is often outsourced. Perhaps
many institutional investors outsource governance analysis and proxy analysis because
they do not believe that significant gains could be realized by focusing on governance
issues. Good governance, as measured through objective (and perhaps even subjective)
analysis is bound to result in Type I errors (false positives) like Enron—companies with
strong governance practices, according to the wisdom of corporate governance metrics,
that still experience major governance breakdowns. On the other hand, governance
analysis will certainly also result in Type II errors (false negatives), as companies with
diligent and effective governance practices that do not meet the corporate governance
industry’s recommendations are penalized for maintaining those practices.

165. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
168. Hilzenrath, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
169. Eleanor Laise, Is This the Most Influential Man on Wall Street?, SMARTMONEY, Oct. 16, 2002,
available at http://www.smartmoney.com/mag/index.cfm?story=oct02-influential.
170. Larry Ribstein, Mildred Van Voorhis Jones Chair, Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law, Comment at
Conglomerate Junior Scholars Workshop (Aug. 22, 2005).
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C. The Homogenization of Corporate Governance
As argued above, much of the rise of the governance industry is explained in part by
tremendous inflow of investor dollars to institutional investors (e.g., through pensions
and 401Ks). Although it is generally true that institutional investors and other governance
services clients have more time and resources to evaluate companies than the individual
investor (and, of course, are paid specifically for their expertise in such evaluation),
institutional investors do not have an unlimited ability to conduct research, and so they
outsource some of this research work to corporate governance advisers. This is not to say
that institutional investors rely solely on the governance research provided by corporate
governance advisers. However, it is probable that institutional investors are more likely to
rely on corporate governance advisers when confronted by an unusual governance
structure simply because they are less likely to possess, or willing to acquire, specialized
knowledge needed to evaluate the structure. To the extent that fund managers defer some
of the governance analysis to governance rating agencies (for example, if a fund manager
decides that it will avoid companies with governance rating below a certain CGQ), a onesize-fits-all approach will punish companies that adopt innovative governance structures.
A one-size-fits-all model essentially standardizes corporate governance and discourages
company-specific (or even industry-specific) governance policies and novel governance
structures and standards.171 On the other hand, we can see how a case-by-case analysis
might promote innovation (or at least not restrict it) by allowing governance raters like
Proxy Governance to evaluate innovations and report on their value as governance
devices. Again, however, although the “objective,” one-size-fits-all model may not
provide a good analysis of a company’s corporate governance, the persistence of the
model may lie in the fact that the use of objective criteria may help eliminate, or at least
lessen, the appearance of potential conflicts of interest where these firms serve both
investors and the company.
While rigid governance metrics may result in an inaccurate assessment of a firm’s
governance, the influence of the corporate governance industry generates a more general,
market-wide concern: the imposition of governance metrics serves to standardize
governance structures and compels a rigid set of acceptable practices in a context where
flexibility should be a goal. Such a concern has been made with respect to the
federalization of corporate law through the encroachment of Sarbanes-Oxley, but it is
also relevant here. As former Delaware Chief Justice Norm Veasey has argued, SarbanesOxley
does not account for the complexities of the corporate environment. Rather than
setting broad standards and allowing public companies some leeway in
determining how best to comply with those standards, Sarbanes-Oxley
“prescribe[s] the precise means by which directors and officers are to pursue
certain ends.” Delaware fiduciary law, by contrast, promotes good governance
practices while “recogniz[ing] that what generally works for most boards may
not be the best method for some others.” Delaware’s approach, which relies on

171. “Innovative” may thus be another way of saying “different”; a company may not be attempting a new
kind of governance model, but may be retaining an older practice that has worked well for the company in the
past.
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the courts to define what is required of officers and directors on a case-by-case
basis, ensures that firms can select the appropriate governance regime for their
situation. This flexibility, so vital to maintaining a sensible, effective regulatory
regime for corporate governance, is largely absent from Sarbanes-Oxley.172
The same may be said for the mandates of many firms in the corporate governance
industry. An inflexible, standardized governance checklist used to determine whether a
company is appropriately governed or whether shareholders should approve a particular
proposal will invariably fail to adequately analyze the governance structure or proposal,
and will also serve to stifle potentially beneficial governance innovations. The
overwhelming market power of ISS underscores this concern. Because corporate
governance ratings firms play a significant role in directing corporate governance
discourse, both through ratings and through proxy advisory work, it is worth considering
whether public company management is effectively being deprived of some essential
latitude in how it may manage the company. The result of a strict set of governance
guidelines, upon which a company’s rating depends, is that the company may be less
likely to consider innovative governance structures (unless, of course, the governance
structure is the structure du jour advocated by the governance industry). It is also worth
noting Delaware Vice Chancellor Leo Strine’s concern that “unlike the individual
investors whose capital they use to wield influence, institutional investors and their
[proxy] advisers bear far less of the residual risk of poor voting decisions, as their
compensation turns more on short-term factors than long-run growth.”173
Recent empirical evidence also suggests that one-size-fits-all governance will
generally produce lower returns than a flexible approach that allows corporations to
deviate from “best practices.” Sridhar Arcot and Valentina Bruno of the London School
of Economics analyzed the effect of corporate governance on performance in the context
of the United Kingdom’s disclose-or-explain corporate governance structure (under this
approach, compliance with a code of best practices is voluntary, but companies must
disclose whether they are complying with the code, and if not, explain why).174 The
authors found that “companies departing from best practice for valid reasons perform
exceptionally well and out-perform the fully-compliant ones. In contrast, mere
compliance with the provisions of the Code does not necessarily result in better
performance.”175 The authors also noted:
An index which identifies better governed companies by analyzing adherence
to governance provision(s) discards relevant information and imposes a one-

172. E. Norman Veasey et al., Federalism vs. Federalization: Preserving the Division of Responsibility in
Corporation Law (Yale Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 324, 2005) (citing William B. Chandler III & Leo E.
Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of
Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 960 (2003)), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=878246.
173. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Towards a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Lucian’s Solution
for Improving Corporate America (Harvard Law & Econ., Discussion Paper No. 541, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=883720.
174. The Combined Code on Corporate Governance, pmbl. para. 4 (2003), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ukla/lr_comcode2003.pdf.
175. Sridhar R. Arcot & Valentina G. Bruno, One Size Does Not Fit After All: Evidence from Corporate
Governance 3 (May 16, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=887947.
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size-fits-all [approach] framework on what is expected from companies. . . .
Not recognizing the . . . heterogeneity among firms by . . . imposing one-sizefits-all approaches would raise efficiency issues. Indeed, there are many
arguments for and against each regulatory proposal, recommendation or
governance criteria.176
Arcot and Bruno’s research suggests that the mandatory provisions of SarbanesOxley and related SEC rulemaking (such as the implementation of internal controls under
section 404) may create inefficiencies by eliminating heterogeneity among firms’
governance structures. However, these same concerns run to the check-the-box
governance criteria of ISS and GMI to the extent that their criteria operate like mandatory
regulations. While it is certain that ISS’ governance criteria are not enforceable by SEC
or other governmental sanction, the significant voting power under ISS’ control and the
influence of ISS with institutional investors may nonetheless compel compliance, thereby
creating a more homogenous corporate population. International competitors of U.S.
companies, by contrast, generally operate under disclose-or-explain governance regimes
such as the United Kingdom’s, “where companies can make different governance choices
reflecting their unique circumstances.”177
Despite the potential for homogenization, a potentially positive effect from the
perspective of management discipline may come from the efforts of the corporate
governance industry (among others) against anti-takeover protections: the success of the
efforts may invigorate the market for corporate control. Indeed, these efforts may be a
significant cause of the recent heavy merger activity in the United States.178
IV. REGULATION OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDUSTRY: PRELIMINARY
CONSIDERATIONS
Ironically, the efforts of the corporate governance industry to fill (and profit from) a
regulatory void raise the question of whether the governance industry itself should be
regulated, with the SEC the most likely regulator. This Article attempts to outline several
problems which might justify regulation.
However, with the possible exception of conflicts of interest (which, for this reason,
receives the most attention), I believe that these problems would not be solved, and may
even be exacerbated, by SEC regulation. The following sections outline some preliminary
thoughts on the regulation of conflicts, methodology concerns, and the homogenization
of corporate law.179
A. Conflicts
As noted above, various state pension funds have responded to perceived conflicts
176. Id. (manuscript at 2-3).
177. Id. at (manuscript at 3).
178. 2006 was a record year for M & A, with the value of acquisitions totaling over $4 trillion. See Joe Bel
Bruno, Merger Activity Lifts Investors, BEACON J., Dec. 31, 2006.
179. My belief that the federalization of corporate law will ultimately result in a less flexible, less
responsive corporate governance framework obviously limits the scope of my vision. Scholars that are not
restrained by such a concern will likely see no difficulties in SEC regulation of the corporate governance
industry.
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of interest within ISS by migrating to other proxy advisers.180 Aside from market
pressure, existing SEC rules under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers
Act”), and particularly through proxy voting regulations passed in 2003, also provide
some conflicts prevention for governance raters that are also doing proxy advisory
work.181 Under the Advisers Act, proxy advisers have a fiduciary duty of care to vote
proxies in the clients’ best interests.182 The 2003 regulations:
Require . . . investment adviser[s] that exercise . . . voting authority over client
proxies to adopt policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the
adviser votes proxies in the best interests of clients, to disclose to clients
information about those policies and procedures, and to disclose to clients how
they may obtain information on how the adviser has voted their proxies.183
Note, however, that the rules apply specifically to proxy voting and would not be
appropriate to governance advisory work generally because of the lack of any statutory
duty of care. The potential conflicts of interest created by governance marketers
simultaneously providing governance ratings advice to companies and their investors are
not covered under any existing or proposed SEC rules.
The SEC does not specify specific policies for advisers to insure that they will vote
in the best interests of clients; nor does the SEC provide a list of approved procedures
because it believes that “[i]nvestment advisers registered with [the SEC] are so varied
that a one-size-fits-all approach is unworkable. By not mandating specific policies and
procedures, [the SEC] leaves advisers the flexibility to craft policies and procedures
suitable to their businesses and the nature of the conflicts they face.”184 ISS, for example,
has put in place a “firewall” similar to the kind of structural protections used by banks to
keep separate the research and investment banking units.185 In a no-action request letter
to the Division of Investment Management, ISS describes the firewall, noting, among
other things, that the “firewall involves functional, physical, and technological
separations.”186 The management and staff of the research departments that analyze
proxies and formulate voting recommendations are “completely different from the
management and staff of the Corporate Programs division who supply the web-based
tools and publications to corporate clients and provide advice in connection
therewith.”187 The research staff and corporate programs staff operate out of separate and
secure areas at ISS’ headquarters, and they maintain separate and secure office equipment
and information databases. It appears that the research staff has no way of knowing

180. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
182. See SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2106, 17 C.F.R. § 275 (2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2106.htm.
183. Id. (emphasis added).
184. Id.
185. Sec.
&
Exch.
Comm.,
The
Global
Research
Analyst
Settlement,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/globalsettlement.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2007) (stating that most investment
banks have followed the lead of WorldCom and started using firewalls).
186. Letter from Mari Anne Pisarri, Attorney, Pickard and Djinis LLP, to Douglas J. Scheidt, Assoc. Dir.,
Sec.
&
Exch.
Comm’n
(Sept.
15,
2004),
available
at,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/iss091504.htm.
187. Id.
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whether clients purchase advisory services, since “both the Corporate Programs staff and
the sales staff for the corporate products have been trained in the requirement to keep the
identities of the issuer clients confidential, and they communicate with those clients in a
secure fashion.”188 ISS has also instituted a “blackout” policy, so that the advisory
division may not provide any advisory services to issuers or access to the web-based tools
from the time a definitive proxy statement is filed and until the date of the issuer’s
shareholders’ meeting.189 Since the no-action request, ISS has attempted to further
separate its investor and corporate advisory businesses by creating a stand-alone
subsidiary called ISS Corporate Services.190
ISS also believes that the publication of its Proxy Voting Manual helps protect
against conflicts by making clear its position on various issues so that “each individual
proxy analysis and voting recommendation is made on an objective basis.”191 Again,
however, this raises the concerns created by a one-size-fits-all approach, which is perhaps
necessitated by a need to appear objective. Further, these policies will incorporate the
same errors as the corporate governance ratings, especially since the proxy advisory arm
of ISS generally relies on the same policy constructs as ISS’ governance ratings business.
Several points are worth noting in connection with the Division of Investment
Management’s response to the no-action request letter. First, the Division of Investment
Management does not specifically grant no-action relief to ISS, noting that:
In your letter, you specifically request no-action relief under rule 206(4)-6
under the Advisers Act. That rule addresses the adoption, implementation and
disclosure of proxy voting procedures that are reasonably designed to ensure
that investment advisers vote client proxies in their clients’ best interests. You
do not, however, request relief from any requirement of the rule. Consequently,
we will not respond to your request for no-action relief under the rule.192
Second, like all SEC no-action letters, the SEC makes clear that it does not
specifically approve of the ISS firewall, stating that it “take[s] no position . . . regarding
whether ISS’ conflict procedures . . . effectively ensure that its proxy voting
recommendations to investment advisers are impartial.”193 Finally, the Division of
Investment Management represents just one potential regulator within the SEC itself. The
Division of Corporation Finance, which oversees proxy and shareholder proposal review
and generally covers proxy policymaking, has stepped in to provide rules designed to

188. Id. ISS also discloses the existence of its corporate relationships on each proxy analysis:
This issuer may have purchased self-assessment tools and publications from ISS, or ISS’
Corporate Programs Division may have provided advisory or analytical services to the issuer in
connection with the proxies described in this report. Neither the issuer nor any Corporate
Programs Division employee played a role in the preparation of this report. To inquire about any
issuer's use of ISS Corporate Programs products please email disclosure@issproxy.com.
Id.
189. Id.
190. See Message from John M. Connolly, President and Chief Executive Officer, Inst. S’holder Servs., ISS
Creates
New
Corporate
Services
Subsidiary,
available
at
http://www.issproxy.com/about/ceoarchive/0706ceomessage.jsp (last visited Apr. 20, 2007).
191. Id.
192. Letter from Mari Anne Pisarri to Douglas J. Scheidt, supra note 186, at n.2.
193. Id.
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limit auditor and analyst conflicts of interest and could design rules relating to proxy
advisers. It is possible that the Division of Corporation Finance would take a different
view of ISS’ potential conflicts than the Division of Investment Management and, given
its history with such rulemaking, it seems less likely that ISS’ procedures would merit a
no-action letter from the Division of Corporation Finance. In sum, the Division of
Corporation Finance is under no obligation to refrain from regulating the corporate
governance industry nor from referring a conflicts matter to the SEC’s Division of
Enforcement if it perceives a problem with the industry’s activities.194
Other conflicts prevention rules, developed to address analyst conflicts of interest,
provide models that may be more applicable to governance rating than the proxy voting
rules. Regulation AC, which deals with analyst conflicts, addresses these concerns
through a certification procedure. The certification requirement applies to “brokers,
dealers, and their associated persons that are ‘covered persons’ that publish, circulate, or
provide research reports.”195 The regulation requires analysts to certify that “the views
expressed in the research report accurately reflect such research analyst’s personal views
about the subject securities and issuers,” and also
(1) that no part of his or her compensation was, is, or will be directly or
indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views contained in the
research report; or (2) that part or all of his or her compensation was, is, or will
be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views
contained in the research report. If the analyst’s compensation was, is, or will
be directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views
contained in the research report, the statement must include the source, amount,
and purpose of such compensation, and further disclose that it may influence
the recommendation in the research report.196
As a conflicts prevention device, a certification procedure may be appropriate for
governance ratings agencies, and would perhaps be welcomed by the corporate
governance industry because it would enhance the credibility of internal conflicts
prevention controls. Like Regulation AC, such a rule could require a certification that the
analyst’s compensation is not tied to the specific recommendations or views contained in
the research report, and if the analyst’s compensation is tied to specific recommendations
or views, the certification should disclose the source, amount, and purpose of such
compensation. A firm that uses quantitative methodology could argue that no conflict is
possible given the objective nature of the analysis (there really are no analysts for
governance ratings—just persons who collect data then input them into a model, without
any opportunity to benefit from the analysis). However, the SEC considered but did not

194. Although the Division of Corporation Finance almost certainly would consult with the Division of
Investment Management (IM) on the issue, the fact that IM did not grant specific no-action relief seems to leave
the issue open to the Division of Corporation Finance. However, because ISS falls under IM’s purview as a
consultant to investment advisers, the Division of Corporation Finance may be deferential to IM’s decision,
although neither the Division of Corporation Finance nor the Division of Enforcement would be bound by IM’s
letter.
195. Letter from Mari Anne Pisarri, supra note 186, at n.2.
196. Regulation Analyst Certification, Securities Act Release No. 8193, Exchange Act Release No. 47,384,
68 Fed. Reg. 9841 (Apr. 14, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8193.htm.
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accept that argument with respect to Regulation AC.197 The SEC noted in the final rule
release that if there is no identified analyst because the report is based on the firm’s
quantitative or technical model:
the firm itself may provide the certifications that the views expressed in the
research report accurately reflect the firm’s quantitative research model, and
that no part of the firm’s compensation was, is, or will be, directly or indirectly,
related to the specific recommendations or views disclosed in the research
report.198
The SEC also noted the possibility that a model could be skewed to favor certain
companies:
tying an analyst’s [or a firm’s] compensation to the performance of a
quantitative or technical model would indicate that the report is the product of
the analyst’s subjective views (reflected by the design of the model employed).
In that case, that analyst must certify the report containing the model’s results
in accordance with . . . Regulation AC.199
In the case of a governance ratings agency that also provides governance advisory
services, the agency would likely create a “firewall” (as ISS has apparently done) in order
to eliminate the possibility of a violation. The principal benefits of this form of regulation
are that it allows the ratings firm to craft its own policies while encouraging sound
conflicts prevention policies, and it provides the SEC a direct means to enforce
governance ratings firms’ conflicts. Also, if this Article’s hypothesis that the perception
of a conflict of interest may exacerbate methodology problems (firms worried about
conflicts will use a more objective but less accurate “one-size-fits-all” methodology) is
correct, a rule that certifies that there are no conflicts may relieve some of the pressure on
these firms to stick with such a methodology, encouraging them to opt instead for a more
flexible, case-by-case analysis.
Despite these benefits, however, it is worth considering whether governance ratings
firms, in response to market pressures, will effectively self-regulate with respect to
conflicts. For example, because of rules requiring proxy voting firms to vote in a client’s
best interest, some firms, such as ISS, have put in place sophisticated conflicts prevention
procedures that should also prevent conflicts between governance ratings and governance
advisory work. Other firms will also have basic competitive incentives to avoid
conflicts—most importantly, their credibility as ratings firms may be jeopardized by the
appearance of conflicts. A number of pension funds have migrated away from ISS,
despite its conflicts prevention rules, because ISS suffers from the perception (although
perhaps not the reality) of conflicts of interest.200 If ISS continues to lose business, it
may be pressured to strengthen the wall between its consulting business and its proxy
advisory/governance ratings businesses. However, it is not clear how ISS could do this
since, as noted above, ISS has created a stand-alone subsidiary for corporate advisory
services and has separated the physical and technological operations of the potentially

197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Starkman, supra note 7.
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conflicting business units. But in any case, what may be at the root of the pension funds’
concern is not the potential for conflicts per se, but the fact that ISS gives advice to
companies at all, even if ISS only has the benign intention of enabling companies to
improve their governance. Would ISS accept an unassailable conflicts prevention
device—the sale of its corporate consulting businesses? The selling point of ISS’
consulting service is that it can tell issuers exactly what they need to do in order to
receive a good governance rating or approval for a compensation plan, so it is unlikely
that ISS’ consulting business could be as successful as a completely independent
enterprise.
Another justification for allowing corporate governance raters to self-regulate is that
SEC regulation of the industry may actually increase the market power of the few major
corporate governance players. As Jonathan Macey has argued in the context of
derivatives regulation (a much more competitive industry than governance ratings, at
least in terms of the number of significant market participants), the fixed costs associated
with regulation would serve as barriers to entry of new competitors in the market.201 This
would be an especially unfortunate side-effect in a market that is already dominated by a
single firm which competes with only a handful of others.
B. Methodology Concerns
While there are good reasons why SEC regulation of conflicts of interest within
corporate governance firms may not be ideal, the case for SEC regulation of methodology
problems is even more tenuous. In the context of proxy advice, the Investment Advisers
Act rule requiring advisers to vote in the shareholders’ best interest may provide some
general protection against outrageous methodological flaws. However, the more
fundamental methodology concerns outlined above, which are perhaps more significant
in governance ratings work than proxy advisory work, would be extremely difficult for
the SEC to regulate.202 This is especially so given that the basic premise of methodology
regulation seems functionally equivalent to merit regulation, which is not part of the
SEC’s regulation program (the only area of SEC regulation that has come close is the
SEC review of shareholder proposals that companies wish to exclude under Rule 14a8).203 Without a direct mandate from Congress, the SEC could only regulate
methodology through disclosure and related antifraud rules. It is unlikely that the precise
methodology would be disclosed, however. In order to protect trade secrets, the SEC does

201. Jonathan Macey, Wall Street Versus Main Street: How Ignorance, Hyperbole, and Fear Lead to
Regulation, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1487 (1998). Macey notes that “[l]ong ago George Stigler recognized that
regulation, including regulation of the securities markets, provided significant benefits to competitors by
cartelizing the industry.” Id. at 1506 (citing George Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J.
BUS. 117 (1964)). Note that this concern is somewhat mitigated by the fact that SEC regulation akin to
Regulation AC would favor the creation of governance firms that are either investor-focused or issuer-focused,
but not both, due to the cost of conflicts prevention.
202. Proxy advice, at least as performed by ISS, is not quite as black-and-white as its governance ratings—
there is at least a basic review of the proposal, rather than a simple data entry function as takes place with
governance ratings.
203. See Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45
ALA. L. REV. 879, 886-89 (1994) (arguing that the responsibility for regulatory reform under Rule 14a-8 lies
with the SEC).
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not require such disclosure under its new rules for credit rating agencies (CRAs),204 and
it is unlikely that such disclosure would be required from governance raters. Instead of
requiring methodology disclosure, however, perhaps the SEC could require a certification
from the governance ratings firm that the rating represents the governance raters “true
belief,” as with research analyst certification.205 Similar to the rules now applicable to
credit ratings agencies, the SEC could also mandate that the governance ratings firms use
systematic procedures “designed to ensure credible and reliable ratings, manage potential
conflicts of interest, and prevent the misuse of nonpublic information, and [have]
sufficient financial resources to ensure compliance with those procedures.”206 To protect
trade secrets, merely requiring a basic description of the methodology, without requiring
discussion of the weighting methodology, might be appropriate. However, the ratings
firms already do this to some degree (at least those that rely on a one-size-fits-all
approach), so the market is able to analyze whether such a method would work.
For these reasons, the best protection against methodology concerns may be simply
heightened scrutiny by researchers, which will hopefully increase institutional investors’
awareness of the flaws in proxy vote recommendations and governance ratings
methodology. As discussed above, some governance metrics correspond to measurable
improvements in firm performance while some do not, even though they have generally
been thought to correlate with good firm performance.207 Further, if ratings accuracy is to
be a serious consideration, the complexity of the variables involved may ultimately
preclude broadly applicable objectives measures. One might imagine that while certain
governance criteria matter, they may only be important if other governance structures are
present, or if a company is of a certain size, has a certain shareholder composition, or is at
a certain stage of its life-cycle. Figuring out what matters, and what does not, all within a
regulatory environment that is perpetually unstable (whether under Delaware decisions,
new SEC rules, or exchange listing standard changes), will no doubt be an elusive goal.
C. The Homogenization of Corporate Law
The homogenization of corporate law is directly related to issues of methodology. I
readily acknowledge that it is reasonable to restrict management activities in situations
where we know such activities would damage a company. Professor Bebchuk and his
colleagues, for example, have spent a great deal of effort arguing that certain antitakeover structures damage companies, and he has produced evidence to demonstrate
how that is so.208 Accepting their research, we might agree that a company that institutes
such poison pill structures (especially in combination with other structures such as a
classified board) should receive a lower governance rating. Even in this scenario,
however, we should be careful about applying general prohibitions—in some cases, such
a structure might be consistent with shareholder interests if, as some argue, pills are used
to increase an acquisition price. On the other hand, even where there is no such evidence

204. See Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, Exchange Act Release No.
33-8570, 85 SEC Docket 607 (Apr. 19, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8570.pdf.
205. Id.
206. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b–10 (2006).
207. See supra Part II.B and accompanying text.
208. Bebchuk et al., supra note 116.
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that a particular structure is undesirable, the fact that a governance ratings agency
believes it to be may impede management from adopting it.
Again, I believe this concern is best addressed through the force of continued
research. If research suggests that a particular “bad” governance structure does not
negatively affect firm value (or perhaps is even shown to positively affect firm value),
governance ratings agencies should cease penalizing it. If they do not, hopefully investors
will discipline the ratings agency by moving to a competitor, or, in the case of proxy
advice, will simply not follow the recommendation. However, this depends on the ability
of the investors to recognize when ratings agencies are not in step with the research. It is
not certain that institutional investors will see significant value in exploiting such
inefficiencies.
One area in which the SEC could act is in clarifying fiduciary responsibilities with
respect to proxy voting. The SEC’s proxy voting rules have played a major role in the
recent growth of the corporate governance industry. If the goal of the new proxy voting
rules was to produce more dedicated oversight by fund managers, the regulation has the
opposite effect: rather than more oversight, firms now outsource. The SEC could clarify
its rules, however, to make clear that merely following the advice of a corporate
governance adviser will not establish due care with respect to proxy voting.
V. CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article is to encourage academic interest in the corporate
governance industry and its methodology, and to encourage debate on whether and how it
should be monitored or regulated. The corporate governance industry in general plays a
very significant role in capital allocation by collecting governance information and
identifying poor performers. ISS and its competitors are also helping shareholders gain
power209 by providing a more unified voice, and may be (perhaps inadvertently)
invigorating the market for corporate control. However, this Article offers several reasons
why investors should be skeptical of the reliability of some of their recommendations.
Although the SEC may help in this respect by more closely monitoring potential conflicts
of interest within the corporate governance industry, SEC regulation of methodology
concerns does not fall within the SEC’s traditional scope of regulation and is outside the
SEC’s expertise.
Even if we accept that further SEC regulation of corporate governance is unlikely to
help, the problems reducing the effectiveness of the corporate governance industry are
not insurmountable. Increased competition in the industry may help discipline some of
the problematic activity, especially if the competition comes from governance ratings
agencies and proxy advisers that do not rely on unproven governance metrics and do not
adopt a “one-size-fits-all” methodology. Further, there is already some evidence that
investors will punish companies whose practices seem to be in actual or potential conflict
with the investors’ interests. Finally, continued academic interest by finance scholars and
increased interest by legal scholars will also help clients of the corporate governance
industry by testing whether the rules and standards proposed by the industry are
209. Whether or not this is a good thing is another debate. For an excellent recent discussion, see Iman
Anabtawi, Some Skepticism about Increasing Shareholder Power (Univ. of Cal., Los Angeles, Sch. of Law,
Law-Econ Research Paper No. 05-16, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=783044.
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